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ALABAMA LAW REVIEW 
Volume 53 Spring2002 Number3 
(UN) WELCOME CONDUCT AND THE SEXUALLY 
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT 
Henry L. Chambers, Jr. • 
INTRODUCTION 
The law requires that actionable sexual harassment be unwelcome. 
This requirement rests on the notion that welcome conduct does not 
cause sexual harassment harm. When sexual harassment was thought to 
consist largely of face-to-face sex-based conduct such as sexual ad-
vances, the unwelcomeness requirement may have been thought reason-
able. However, as courts have broadened the conduct that may support 
a sexual harassment claim to include all types of gender-based conduct, 
the justification on which the unwelcomeness requirement rests has 
faded. Because the application of the unwelcomeness requirement to all 
potentially harassing, gender-based conduct can lead to results inconsis-
tent with the broadened vision of Title VII, the requirement should be 
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jettisoned. 
Courts, including the Supreme Court, have consistently noted that 
sexual harassment must be unwelcome to be actionable. 1 The unwel-
comeness requirement incorporates the seemingly sensible notion that 
welcome sexual behavior-conduct that would be sexually harassing 
were it not welcome-does not cause the gender-related harm that Title 
VII is supposed to remedy (i.e., the discriminatory provision of terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment because of sex). When first 
recognized by courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC), sexual harassment focused on face-to-face sex-based con-
duct (e.g., sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other con-
duct of a sexual nature).2 That such conduct was not actionable when 
welcome was a seemingly reasonable concession to the notion that Title 
VII does not ban all sex-related activity in the workplace. Simply, 
workplace sexual conduct that did not alter or harm terms of employ-
ment was acceptable; unwelcome sexual conduct that harmed an em-
ployee's terms of employment was banned.3 
Though face-to-face sex-based harassment may still be the most eas-
ily recognizable type of sexual harassment, courts have begun to recog-
nize that Title VII covers gender harassment, of which sex-based har-
assment is a subset. 4 Non-sex-based gender harassment that some courts 
until recently may not have considered sexual harassment because it 
was not sex-related, now may support a sexual harassment claim when 
it results in the alteration or discriminatory provision of an employee's 
terms or conditions of employment. 5 Whether such conduct is sex-based 
is relevant because sex-based conduct is generally assumed to be under-
taken because of the victim's sex (or gender), not because sex-based 
conduct constitutes the whole of sexually harassing conduct. 6 As the 
unwelcomeness requirement rests firmly on the notion that sexually 
harassing conduct is largely sex-based and face-to-face, it may be in-
1. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68-69 (1986); Henson v. City of 
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982). 
2. Indeed, the EEOC's guidelines regarding sexual harassment only specifically include 
"sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual 
nature" in its definition of sexual harassment. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.ll(a) (2001) (originally codified 
in 1980 as 42 U.S.C. 4200e). 
3. See, e.g., Vinson, 477 U.S. at 68-69; Henson, 682 F.2d at 901-05. 
4. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
5. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75. Throughout this Article, I use the term "sex-based" to mean 
related to sexual activity rather than gender. Where appropriate, I use the term gender-based. 
6. Sex-based conduct is generally presumed to be gender-related. See id. at 80 ("Courts and 
juries have found the inference of discrimination easy to draw in most male-female sexual har-
assment situations, because the challenged conduct typically involves explicit or implicit propos-
als of sexual activity; it is reasonable to assume those proposals would not have been made to 
someone of the same sex."). However, this is not always the case. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., 
A Unifying Theory of Sex Discrimination, 34 GA. L. REv. 1591, 1608 n.73 (2000) (noting that 
sex-based conduct is not automatically gender-based). 
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compatible with evolving sexual harassment jurisprudence unless it can 
be appropriately applied to all potentially harassing gender-based con-
duct. 
As courts refine the theory underlying sexual harassment and sex 
discrimination, the unwelcomeness inquiry may become irrelevant to 
determining whether gender-based conduct is sexually harassing. In 
addition, the one possible remaining purpose that the unwelcomeness 
requirement may serve-providing notice to a putative harasser or its 
employer-is now served by an affirmative defense applicable to many 
sexual harassment claims. Consequently, its role should be reexamined. 
This Article does that. Part I of the Article describes a hypothetical 
situation that provides a context in which to consider unwelcomeness. 
Part II provides a brief overview of the evolving sexual harassment 
jurisprudence. Part III examines how the unwelcomeness requirement is 
applied to sexual harassment claims. Part IV analyzes the uneasy and 
incompatible relationship between the unwelcomeness requirement and 
sexual harassment jurisprudence. Part V resolves the tension between 
unwelcomeness and sexual harassment jurisprudence by advocating that 
the unwelcomeness requirement be jettisoned, but that evidence of wel-
comeness be used in some cases to help determine damages. 
I. THE HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION 
Amanda Allen is an outstanding staff accountant at Xl'Z Corp. 
(Xl'Z). She has worked at Xl'Z for three years, and is friendly, well-
liked and well-respected. Amanda has not been up for a promotion in 
her tenure at Xl'Z, but has received pay raises and favorable evalua-
tions. Until recently, Amanda never considered leaving Xl'Z. 
Xl'Z employs two hundred workers, fifteen of whom are managers. 
Though forty percent of Xl'Z's employees are women, only three of its 
managers are women. Xl'Z's office atmosphere is libertine. Gender-
based joking and sexual banter are legion in the office. Dating and in-
timate relationships between co-workers occur occasionally, but they 
are usually discreet. Because offices and cubicles are treated as semi-
personal space, many male employees regularly post sexually sugges-
tive and gender-related bumper stickers, calendars and quotations in 
their work spaces. 
Most of the male employees seem to enjoy the atmosphere at Xl'Z, 
even deeming it fun and progressive in its openness, lack of inhibition, 
and apparent dearth of friction. Only a few female employees embrace 
the atmosphere. Though some complain among themselves, no female 
employees have found the atmosphere sufficiently problematic to com-
plain publicly. Amanda is uncomfortable with the office environment 
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though she has neither been propositioned nor been the direct target of 
gender-based conduct or harassment. Amanda has never complained to 
the managers about the behavior in the office or its general atmosphere; 
in part because she did not want to be thought of as a prude and in part 
because, while there is a general sense that some minimum of decorum 
will be observed in the office, there is no formal harassment policy. 
Additionally, she assumed that the atmosphere would not affect her 
work or advancement. 
Though women are not required to perform job or office functions 
that men are not, there is an expectation that women will handle the 
tasks that might make the workplace somewhat more friendly. Thus, 
the women managers and female secretaries have always planned office 
birthday parties, luncheons, retreats and the firm's holiday party. In 
addition, they have always organized the office's United Way campaign 
and coordinated the office's official notes of condolences or gifts of 
flowers for the deaths or births in families of Xl'Z workers. These tasks 
are neither credited nor mentioned in work evaluations. 
Amanda's outlook on Xl'Z and its office environment changed when 
her friend Becky, another staff accountant, was not promoted to man-
ager a few months ago. Becky, like Amanda, is a friendly, professional 
and outstanding accountant. Becky was told that although her work was 
outstanding, she was not promoted because she did not get along with 
her co-workers as well as, or seem to enjoy working at the company as 
much as, Cindy, the person who was promoted in Becky's stead. Becky 
is very upset by the decision. The promotion would have meant a 
$20,000 pay increase and validation of Becky's superb accountancy 
skills. The failure to be promoted has shaken Becky's confidence, and 
she is contemplating leaving Xl'Z. 
Becky's anxiety was heightened when, upon reflection, both she 
and Amanda realized that prior to being promoted to manager each of 
the female managers in the office had engaged in sexual banter in the 
office, had participated in the sexually charged atmosphere, and had 
volunteered to do the tasks that women in the office were expected to 
do but were not part of their job duties. While Amanda and Becky do 
not know if any of the female managers were ever romantically in-
volved with co-workers or other managers, each of the female manag-
ers was widely thought to have dated co-workers. Not surprisingly, 
Becky believes her treatment was related to her refusal to participate in 
the office's atmosphere. Becky and Amanda have avoided participation 
in the workplace sexual banter and have not volunteered to coordinate 
office parties and the like. Amanda is also upset, believing that she also 
will not be promoted because she has not actively participated in the 
office atmosphere. Both believe that in order to become managers, ei-
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ther they will need to be substantially better candidates for promotion 
than those who embrace the office atmosphere, or they will have to 
embrace the atmosphere. Not surprisingly, both are concerned about 
their futures and are upset that they need to accede to the gendered of-
fice culture to succeed. 
II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Title VII seeks to remove all gender-based barriers to employment 
success by prohibiting sex discrimination in the workplace. 7 This Arti-
cle focuses on intentional discrimination, though Title VII also bans 
unintentional discrimination. 8 
A. Sexual Harassment and Disparate Treatment 
Historically, intentional sex discrimination under Title VII has been 
divided into disparate treatment and sexual harassment, with the two 
types of discrimination being treated differently.9 Disparate treatment 
was the first type of sex discrimination recognized under, Title VII, and 
has always been indisputably prohibited by Title VII. 10 It occurs when 
an employee is treated differently with respect to compensation, terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment because of sex (e.g., when a 
woman is denied a job because she is a woman or a man is denied a job 
because he is a man). 11 While disparate treatment claims can be quite 
varied, they all stem from the basic notion that an employee was denied 
specific job benefits or provided those benefits in a discriminatory 
manner because of the employee's gender. 12 
Though sexual harassment and disparate treatment have often been 
considered distinct, both are actionable because they are types of sex 
7. Title VII, among other things, prohibits employers from "discriminat[ing] against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment be-
cause of such individual's ... sex." 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2001). 
8. Nonintentional discrimination is termed disparate impact discrimination and occurs when 
a facially neutral job qualification has the impact of disqualifying a disproportionate number of 
employees of a particular gender, race, etc., from a particular job or benefit of such job. See 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonia, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 
424 (1971). 
9. See Rebecca Hanner White, There's Nothing Special About Sex: The Supreme Court 
Mainstreams Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 725, 726 (1999) ("[F]ederal 
judges confronting sexual harassment cases have treated these claims as something special or 
different from run of the mill discrimination claims."). 
10. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971); Sprogis v. United Air 
Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (noting generally that Title VII outlaws dispa-
rate treatment). 
11. See Phillips, 400 U.S. at 542; Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198. 
12. See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991); Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544. 
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discrimination. 13 Indeed, the similarities between sexual harassment and 
disparate treatment are such that some sexual harassment claims can be 
viewed merely as disparate treatment claims in which the subject con-
duct is harassing. 14 Nonetheless, from a practical standpoint, the struc-
tures of proof surrounding the sexual harassment claim distinguish it 
from a disparate treatment claim. 15 For example, while disparate treat-
ment discrimination need merely result in harm to an employee's terms 
of employment, actionable sexual harassment must be offensive and 
unwelcome. 16 These and other requirements change the nature of sexual 
harassment from a general sex discrimination claim to a claim ostensi-
bly aimed at a specific type of conduct. 
Indeed, the theory underlying the sexual harassment claim was 
thought sufficiently different than that underlying disparate treatment 
discrimination that sexual harassment was not immediately recognized 
as actionable under Title VII. 17 When first examined by courts, sexual 
harassment was often thought to have occurred when sex-based con-
duct, such as acquiescence to sexual demands or the willingness to en-
dure sexual advances, was made a term or condition of an employee's 
employment. 18 Indeed, according to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
13. See White, supra note 9, at 726-30; Steven L. Willborn, Taking Discrimination Seri-
ously: Oncale and the Fate of Exceptionalism in Sexual Harassment Law, 7 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 677, 678 (1999) (noting that Oncale, a sexual harassment case, "brings discrimination 
back into sexual harassment law"). Of course, many courts may provide justifications to treat the 
types of discrimination somewhat differently. See Cheek v. Peabody Coal Co., 97 F.3d 200 (7th 
Cir. 1996). 
14. Based on the definitions of disparate treatment and sexual harassment, little seems to 
distinguish them. I and others have argued that sexual harassment is merely a specialized version 
of sex discrimination. See generally Chambers, supra note 6; White, supra note 9; Willborn, 
supra note 13. 
15. Compare Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), with Meritor Sav. Bank v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). These distinctions can lead to confusion regarding why sexual 
harassment is considered sex discrimination. Recently, some commentators have explicitly noted 
that courts have never explained precisely why sexual harassment is sex discrimination. See 
Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169 
(1998); Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445 
(1997); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 
(1997); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998). In-
deed, multiple explanations of why sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination have always 
abounded. See generally Abrams, supra note 15 (discussing historical and recent theories of 
sexual harassment); Michael D. Vhay, Note, The Harms of Asking: Towards a Comprehensive 
Treatment of Sexual Harassment, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 328, 340-41 (1988) (discussing various 
early sexual harassment theorists). 
16. Compare Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), with Meritor Sav. Bank v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
17. See Vhay, supra note 15, at 332 ("When plaintiffs first began to bring sexual harassment 
claims under Title VII, the courts rejected them."). 
18. This was expected given the style of case that those courts saw. See CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 
59-77 (1979) (detailing early sexual harassment cases where sexual activity was nearly invariably 
linked to the provision of job benefits). 
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Commission (EEOC), sexual harassment specifically includes, and is 
arguably defined as, "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual 
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. "19 Not 
surprisingly, the prototypical sexual harassment allegation was that a 
male supervisor requested sexual favors from a female subordinate.20 
However, rather than view sexual harassment as the improper link-
ing of employment to sex-based conduct barred by Title VII's prohibi-
tion on sex discrimination, some courts determined that sexual harass-
ment was a private matter between a supervisor and a subordinate that 
did not implicate the employment relationship, the employer, or Title 
VII. 21 Sexual harassment was viewed merely as an inappropriate mani-
festation of sexual desire occurring not because of gender, but because 
of characteristics of the particular employees involved.22 This vision of 
sexual harassment has been supplanted by one which recognizes that, 
when sex-based conduct or sexual activity is linked to terms of em-
ployment, Title VII is implicated. 23 Simply, a supervisor who requires 
that an employee either engage in sex-related activities with him or lose 
19. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1l(a) (2001). However, conduct that may not always be viewed as 
strictly sexual can also support a sexual harassment claim. See, e.g., Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 
529, 532-35 (7th Cir. 1999) (describing violent but non-sexual harassment that might support a 
sexual harassment claim); Shepard v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1002 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(suggesting that non-sexual harassment can be part of harassment claim). 
20. See MACKINNON, supra note 18, at 59-77 (detailing early sexual harassment cases which 
seemed to consist almost exclusively of male supervisors harassing subordinate female employees 
in that manner). 
21. The notion was that the activity involved was driven by the personal proclivities of the 
putative harasser and therefore was not related to employer policy. See MACKINNON, supra note 
18, at 59-60. Indeed, courts have continued to argue that sexual harassment is not generally in an 
employer's interest. See, e.g., Dees v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 168 F.3d 417, 421 
n.9 (11th Cir. 1999) ("Most sexual harassment, however, arises from gender-based prejudice or 
a desire for sexual gratification, rather than for the purpose of furthering the employer's inter-
ests."). Of course, the notion that an employer has no incentive to allow sexual harassment to 
continue may be wrong. Employers have an incentive to allow sexual harassment to continue if 
the result is a more productive workplace on average. See J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile 
Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2305 (1999) ("Employers may accept (or ignore) sex 
discrimination by their male employees (including discrimination through sexual harassment) in 
order to avoid labor disruption and preserve esprit de corps and loyalty among a particular class 
of valuable (male) workers."). When the owner of the business is the harasser, that sexual har-
assment is not in the employer's interest becomes less tenable. Cf. Christina A. Bull, Comment, 
The Implications of Admitting Evidence of a Sexual Harassment Plaintiff's Speech and Dress in 
the Aftermath of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 117, 135-43 (1993) 
(noting that the power to sexually harass may come from power in the workplace wielded by 
supervisors and business owners). Such was the case in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 
u.s. 17 (1993). 
22. See MACKINNON, supra note 18, at 59-60; Vhay, supra note 15, at 334 ("In order to 
win their discrimination actions, sexually harassed plaintiffs realized that they had to convince 
the courts that harassment involved more than 'personal' acts."). 
23. See Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 778 (2d Cir. 1994) (conditioning terms of 
employment on acquiescence to harassing conduct is crux of harassment claim); Bridges v. East-
man Kodak Co., 885 F. Supp. 495, 496-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting generally that sexual har-
assment is based on linking gender-based conduct to terms of employment). 
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her job has altered the employee's terms of employment and makes the 
demand at least in part because of the employee's sex.24 Thus, the su-
pervisor has engaged in actionable conduct. 25 
B. Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Work Environment Harassment 
Historically, sexual harassment has been divided into quid pro quo 
and hostile work environment harassment.26 Until relatively recently, 
the distinction between the types of harassment was thought to be in the 
type of conduct that caused the harm. Quid pro quo harm was thought 
to flow from explicit demands for sexual conduct usually initiated by an 
employee's superior; hostile work environment harm was thought to 
flow from an atmosphere of abuse surrounding the employee's work-
place, whether created by superiors or not.27 However, the Supreme 
Court has determined that the sole difference between quid pro quo and 
hostile work environment harassment is that quid pro quo harassment 
results in tangible job detriment, 28 while hostile work environment har-
assment does not. 29 The key is the effect that the harassment has on the 
terms, conditions or privileges of an employee's employment, rather 
24. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
25. That it took so long for some courts to realize this may be a testament to sexism in our 
society. Cf. Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 45-46 (1990). Pollack states that: 
Sexual harassment was first recognized in 1976 as a legal cause of action under Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Prior to this, courts treated sexual harass-
ment in the workplace as a personal matter, neither employment-related nor sex-
based. But the history and pervasiveness of sexual harassment in the workplace has 
been well documented. 
/d. at 45-46 (footnotes omitted). Vhay, supra note 15, at 337 (noting that the transformation of 
viewing sexual harassment as "an outgrowth of inharmonious personal relationships to a recogni-
tion that many forms of harassment are discriminatory" took twelve years). 
26. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Lucas v. South Nassau Communities Hasp., 54 F. Supp. 2d 141, 
146 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that quid pro quo and hostile work environment are the two types 
of sexual harassment). 
27. Compare Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1315 (11th Cir. 1989), 
with Lucas, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 146. 
28. See E/lerth, 524 U.S. at 753-54. I have argued elsewhere that whenever an employee's 
terms of employment include the acceptance of any form of sexual harassment, a quid pro quo 
harassment claim should lie. See Chambers, supra note 6, at 1614-15. Whether the job detriment 
is tangible should matter, not whether the job detriment is substantial. See Bryson v. Chicago 
State Univ., 96 F.3d 912, 916-17 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that relatively minor tangible job det-
riment can support a quid pro quo claim); Collins v. State of Ill., 830 F.2d 692, 703 (7th Cir. 
1987) (noting various types of job detriment that do not affect a plaintiff's income). But see 
Theresa M. Beiner, Do Reindeer Games Count as Terms, Conditions or Privileges of Employ-
ment Under Title VII?, 37 B.C. L. REV. 643 (1996); Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Dis-
crimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121 (1998). 
29. Historically, they had been thought to be more fundamentally different. See Bryson, 96 
F.3d at 915 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that basis for quid pro quo harassment was recognized before 
basis for hostile work environment discrimination). 
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than the type of conduct that supports each cause of action. 30 The proto-
typical example of quid pro quo harassment-a supervisor's termination 
of a subordinate for refusing to yield to the supervisor's sexual de-
mands-constitutes quid pro quo harassment because gender-based har-
assment concretely altered an employee's terms of employment and 
resulted in a tangible job detriment (i.e., the firing). 31 
Hostile work environment harassment is sexual harassment that 
constructively alters an employee's terms or conditions of employ-
ment, 32 but does not result in actual job detriment. 33 Such harassment 
must be severe or pervasive, offensive to the plaintiff, 34 offensive to a 
reasonable person in the plaintiffs situation, and unwelcome.35 In addi-
tion, the employer must be deemed responsible for the harassing con-
duct or its result. 36 The test for what constitutes a hostile work envi-
30. The difference can be so slight that some question whether the terms quid pro quo and 
hostile work environment are of much value at all. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751 (1998) ("The 
terms quid pro quo and hostile work environment are helpful, perhaps, in making a rough de-
marcation between cases in which threats are carried out and those where they are not or are 
absent altogether, but beyond this are of limited utility."). 
31. See id. at 753-54; Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 778 (2d Cir. 1994). 
32. See Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1245-46 (11th Cir. 1999). 
33. Of course, the atmosphere in which an employee works can be as important as any other 
term of employment. See Barbara Verdonik, Comment, Abolishing the Quid Pro Quo and Work 
Environment Distinctions in Sexual Harassment Cases Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Vin-
son v. Taylor, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 177, 190 (1985) ("[E]mployers delegate to their supervi-
sors the authority to maintain a good working environment-and that environment constitutes a 
significant employment right."). 
34. See Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that actionable 
harassment must be subjectively offensive to plaintiff); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. 
Supp. 847, 876 (D. Minn. 1993) (noting that sexual harassment requires subjective harm, and 
suggesting that when multiple women are subjected to the same conduct some may be harmed 
and others may not be harmed). 
35. See Burns v. McGregor, 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992). The Burns court stated that: 
To prevail in her sexual harassment claim based on 'hostile environment', Burns 
must show that 1) she belongs to a protected group; 2) she was subject to unwel-
come sexual harassment; 3) the harassment was based on sex; 4) the harassment af-
fected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and 5) McGregor knew or 
should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action. 
/d. The EEOC guidelines note that conduct is considered sexual harassment: 
when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term 
or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such 
conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting 
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably in-
terfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hos-
tile, or offensive working environment. 
29 C.F.R. § 1604.ll(a) (2001). 
36. See Balkin, supra note 21, at 2297 (noting that only employers that knew or should have 
known will be liable under Title VII); accord Note, Notice in Hostile Environment Discrimina-
tion Law, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1977, 1978 (1999). This requirement has led to the creation of an 
affirmative defense for the employer. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 
(1998) ("The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reason-
able care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plain-
tiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities 
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise."); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 
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ronment is not precise, and context matters. 37 Therefore, when, as in 
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 38 the president of a company continu-
ally insults an employee because of her gender, suggests that her suc-
cess with customers may be due to promises of sexual activity, and 
suggests that her salary could be negotiated with him in a motel room, a 
hostile work environment may exist. 39 Even though no tangible job det-
riment occurred-the employee quit rather than continue to endure the 
behavior40-the gender-based conduct created an atmosphere in which 
the harasser's conduct may have made the plaintiffs job significantly 
more difficult to do because of her gender. 41 The plaintiff suffered harm 
to be sure, but there did not appear to be a tangible job detriment. 
Though the style of behavior underlying the two types of sexual 
harassment can appear different, the same behavior that can support a 
quid pro quo claim may also support a hostile work environment claim. 
For example, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the plaintiff alleged 
·that her supervisor made sexual advances toward her, fondled her and 
raped her on several occasions.42 The plaintiff interpreted the conduct 
as quid pro quo-style harassment in that she feared that she would lose 
her job if she did not engage in sexual relations with her supervisor. 43 
Indeed, had the supervisor fired the employee for refusing to acquiesce, 
her claim would have been a quid pro quo one. 44 However, the Court 
alternatively characterized the supervisor's alleged behavior as hostile 
work environment harassment because, even if the supervisor did not 
condition job benefits on engaging in sexual relations, the conduct was 
of the type and severity that the plaintiff's terms of employment may 
have been constructively altered by having to endure it. 45 That is, the 
environment that resulted from the conduct amounted to the discrimina-
tory provision of conditions of work because of her sex. 
Hostile work environment harassment, whether stemming from 
u.s. 775, 807 (1998). 
37. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) ("[W]hether an environment is 
'hostile' or 'abusive' can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances."); Baskerville 
v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that the "line between a merely 
unpleasant working environment on the one hand and a hostile or deeply repugnant one on the 
other" is not bright). 
38. 510 u.s. 17 (1993). 
39. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 19. 
40. /d. 
41. However, that an employee's job was more difficult to do does not mean that the quality 
of the plaintiff's work declined. See Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1455 (7th 
Cir. 1994) ("The absence of a noticeable decline in job productivity should therefore not be 
unduly emphasized where there is ample evidence showing that the campaign of harassment had 
an impact on its target and made it more difficult for her to do her job."). 
42. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986). 
43. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 60. 
44. !d. at 65. 
45. /d. at 62-73. 
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conduct affecting the working atmosphere as in Harris, or from conduct 
that can be fairly viewed as a prelude to quid pro quo conduct as in 
Vinson,46 focuses on the conditions under which an employee works. 
These conditions may reflect all conduct that creates the atmosphere to 
which the employee is subjected, not merely the harassment targeted at 
her. 47 In this way, the conduct supporting a hostile work environment 
harassment claim can encompass far more than the face-to-face conduct 
that typifies quid pro quo harassment. As we will see later, that hostile 
work environment harassment can be of a very different style of con-
duct than quid pro quo harassment is important in considering the role 
unwelcomeness should play in sexual harassment jurisprudence. 
C. Sex, Gender and Sexual Harassment 
Sexual harassment's initial focus on sex-based conduct put sexual 
activity, rather than the differential treatment of employees because of 
sex, at the heart of sexual harassment jurisprudence, and necessarily 
put such activity at hostile work environment's core.48 However, as 
sexual harassment jurisprudence has evolved, it has been recognized as 
gender-based harassment of which sex-based harassment is a subset.49 
Whether the conduct at issue is sex-based is secondary to whether the 
conduct is gender-motivated.50 Thus, while sex-based conduct can cre-
ate Title VII liability by constructively altering the terms of an em-
ployee's employment, it does not encompass all the conduct that can do 
so.51 Because courts have started to realize that hostile work environ-
ment harassment may include gender-related harassment that construc-
tively alters an employee's terms of employment, those who harass an 
employee in a non-sexual way merely because of her gender (e.g., by 
46. Conduct from either style of harassment can help support a hostile work environment 
claim. See Chambers, supra note 6, at 1620-21. 
47. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) 
(detailing various workplace harassment and suggesting that all such harassment could contribute 
to a hostile work environment); Balkin, supra note 21, at 2296-97 ("A hostile environment is 
made up of individual acts of discriminatory speech and other conduct by all the persons who 
inhabit a workplace, including managers, employees, and even occasionally clients and custom-
ers."). 
48. Of course, even when sex-based conduct is key to a sexual harassment claim, sex does 
not necessarily cause the change in terms of employment, though the misuse of sex can. See 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1997); Mary F. Radford, By Invitation 
Only: The Proof of \Velcomeness in Sexual Harassment Cases, 72 N.C. L. REV. 499, 543 (1994) 
(arguing generally that misuse of sex, rather than sex itself, is the problem). 
49. See, e.g., King v. Hillen, 21 F.3d 1572, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("Conduct that is based 
on the sex of the victim, whether or not the conduct is 'of a sexual nature,' is appropriately 
considered in determining whether an abusive or hostile environment has been created."). 
50. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78. 
51. See, e.g., Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine, 32 F.3d 1007, 1009 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting a 
blend of sex-based and gender-based harassment aimed at the only female worker in a tinsmith 
shop). 
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demeaning her to others or destroying her work tools), may engage in 
hostile work environment harassment. 52 
Title VII seeks to allow all workers to succeed based on ability 
rather than their gender. Making hostile work environment sexual har-
assment actionable embraces this goal by attempting to eliminate harm-
ful gender-motivated harassment. 53 Whether workplace conduct pro-
duces a uniquely hostile workplace atmosphere for a particular worker 
through sexual advances, propositions and other conduct, or a generally 
hostile workplace atmosphere that harms any or all workers of a par-
ticular sex, hostile work environment harassment liability can be used 
to make certain that the conditions under which an employee works will 
not harm that employee's ability to succeed because of sex.54 The 
evolving nature of sexual harassment law forces us to reexamine 
whether the unwelcomeness requirement helps or hinders the appropri-
ately forceful application of Title VII. 55 
Our hypothetical situation helps crystallize some of the issues. The 
workplace at XfZ is gendered and sexualized. That is, gender-based 
conduct in the workplace is pervasive. If such conduct amounts to har-
assment that affects Amanda or Becky's terms of employment, Title VII 
may be breached. The promotion pattern at XfZ may suggest that 
unless Amanda and Becky are willing to participate in and perpetuate 
the gendered and sexualized atmosphere at XfZ, they will not reach 
their potential at XfZ. This appears to be a gender-based harm. Were 
Becky to bring a claim, it would stem from her advancement having 
been contingent on embracing the workplace atmosphere. Similarly, 
Amanda's potential hostile work environment claim would be based on 
the notion that the gendered workplace atmosphere necessarily makes 
52. Recognition of this may be somewhat uneven because some courts have regarded gender-
based harassment as sexual harassment for a long time while others have only recently realized 
it. See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir. 1987); McKinney v. Dole, 
765 F.2d 1129, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Bull, supra note 21, at 138-40 (noting that co-
workers can send powerful sexually harassing signals that are unrelated to sex). 
53. Conduct that is not harinful would not be a problem. See Radford, supra note 48, at 541 
("The goal of sexual harassment law in general is not to eliminate the sexual undercurrent at 
work, an undercurrent that may be beneficial or at least nonoffensive to many individuals of both 
genders, but rather to hold those who would force it on others responsible for their actions."). 
54. The employee need not be harmed enough to hurt her performance. She need merely be 
provided poorer conditions in which to work because of her sex. See Davis v. United States 
Postal Serv., 142 F.3d 1334, 1341 (lOth Cir. 1998) (noting generally that worker's ability to 
function in job need not be impaired for worker to suffer from hostile work environment); King 
v. Hillen, 21 F.3d 1572, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("That women who are the objects of discrimina-
tory behavior because of their sex are able to maintain satisfactory job performance is not 
grounds for denigrating their concerns."). 
55. For an example of a particularly aggressive (and possibly correct) stance toward protect-
ing workers, see Joshua Burstein, Testing the Strength of Title VII Sexual Harassment Protection: 
Can It Support a Hostile Work Environment Claim Brought By a Nude Dancer?, 24 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & Soc. CHANGE 271, 314 (1998) (concluding that Title VII should protect nude dancers from 
sexual harassment). 
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her job more difficult to do because of gender, by forcing her to accept 
the workplace atmosphere or be a better worker in order to have a 
chance to advance. Because the workplace conduct and atmosphere ap-
pear to limit Amanda's and Becky's potential because of sex-a real 
Title VII harm-whether Amanda or Becky will have a viable Title VII 
claim may depend on whether the conduct at issue is sufficient to sus-
tain a sexual harassment claim, including whether the conduct at issue 
is unwelcome. 
III. UNWELCOMENESS 
A. The Genesis of Unwelcomeness 
Sexual harassment's unwelcomeness requirement stems from the 
EEOC's Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, originally 
promulgated in 1980.56 Those Guidelines note that: 
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and 
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute 
sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made 
either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individ-
ual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such con-
duct by an individual is used as the basis for employment deci-
sions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the pur-
pose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's 
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offen-
sive working environment. 57 
These Guidelines have been consistently cited by courts as a work-
ing definition of sexual harassment.58 Though the Guidelines provide a 
list of conduct that may constitute sexual harassment, some courts seem 
to take the Guidelines to be the definition of sexual harassment, treating 
the listed conduct as exclusive. 59 Regardless of how fully the Guidelines 
56. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.ll(a) (2001). 
51. § 1604.11(a). 
58. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (citing the Guidelines and 
nothing more to support its suggestions that "[t]he gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is 
that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome"'); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 
611, 619 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing the Guidelines and noting that plaintiff had to prove that she 
"was subjected to unwelcomed sexual harassment"); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 
903 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing the Guidelines to support notion that an element of a hostile work 
environment claim is that "[t]he employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment.") (em-
phasis omitted). 
59. Indeed, courts suggesting that sexual harassment conduct must be sex-based, rather than 
merely gender-based, would seem to have taken this position. See, e.g., Jones v. Flagship lnt'l, 
793 F.2d 714, 720 n.5 (5th Cir. 1986); Downes v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 775 F.2d 288, 290 
(Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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are deemed to have defined sexually harassing conduct, courts have 
consistently suggested that conduct supporting an actionable sexual har-
assment claim must be unwelcome.60 
Underlying the unwelcomeness requirement is the notion that con-
duct related to sexual activity is at the core of sexual harassment law, 
and that because it can be welcome outside of the workplace, it can also 
be welcome when it occurs in the workplace. 61 In addition, the fact that 
unwelcomeness is required suggests that all conduct supporting a har-
assment claim must be unwelcome to be actionable. 62 Two problems 
accompany the above notion. First, because sex-based conduct is not 
the only type of sexually harassing conduct in the workplace, requiring 
that all conduct supporting an actionable sexual harassment claim be 
unwelcome may not be sensible. Second, as sex-based workplace be-
havior may have different implications than sex-based behavior outside 
of the workplace, treating them as similar may not make sense. 63 The 
power inequalities inherent in the workplace may suggest that sex-based 
workplace conduct should not be treated merely as sex-based conduct 
that happens to occur in the workplace.64 
Nonetheless, the unwelcomeness requirement has at least two possi-
ble justifications. The first is that welcome conduct causes no harm to 
the employee's terms, conditions or privileges of employment. This 
would seem to stem from the belief that sexual harassment prototypi-
cally involves sexual advances and requests for sexual activity-conduct 
60. See supra notes 1, 58. 
61. See Janine Benedet, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims and the Unwelcome 
Influence of Rape Law, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 125, 159 (1995) (noting that "[t]he EEOC has 
defended the inclusion of this [unwelcomeness] element in the prima facie case on the ground 
that the same behavior can amount to harassment or to enjoyable sexual activity, depending on 
the attitudes of those involved" and citing the EEOC's amicus brief in Meritor Sav. Bank v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)). 
62. Some courts appear to view the ultimate sexual activity as the activity that must be wel-
come or unwelcome, with the steps leading up to the activity being important but not central to 
the inquiry. This theory would suggest that if a supervisor thinks that an employee might be 
sexually attracted to him, then the steps used to determine whether the attraction exists are not 
really subject to liability. See Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc. 913 F.2d 456, 459-60 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (suggesting that the fondling of a subordinate's breast may merely have been mis-
guided attempt at signaling attraction rather than harassment). 
63. The power inequality occurring in the workplace may not occur in other situations. See 
MACKINNON, supra note 18, at 1-2 (noting the power dynamic in the workplace that makes 
sexual harassment particularly problematic); Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask For It?: The 
"Unwelcomen Requirement In Sexual Harassment Cases, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1558, 1575 
(1992) ("[T]he 'unwelcomeness' requirement ... does not adequately account for the power 
dynamics of the workplace."). 
64. See Benedet, supra note 61, at 166 ("To argue that welcomeness is presumed and that 
unwelcomeness must be proven is to assume that sexual comments or physical touching are 
wanted by women at work."); Radford, supra note 48, at 504-05 ("While physical contact may 
be inevitable and normal in a crowded world, sexual advances in the workplace need not be an 
inevitable aspect of a gender-integrated work environment and will only be characterized as 
'normal' if machismo is used as the measuring standard of normalcy."). 
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that can literally be enjoyed. Were sexual harassment so limited, and 
were such conduct required to be affirmatively welcomed by the target 
to be deemed welcome, such conduct might be harmless to the em-
ployee's terms of employment. When unwelcome harassment in the 
form of a sexually predatory boss is juxtaposed with welcome sex-based 
conduct in the form of a pleasurable office romance, 65 requiring unwel-
comeness may appear reasonable. Similarly, when playful sexual banter 
and mild off-color joking is juxtaposed with ugly, unwanted harassment 
based on gender animus, requiring unwelcomeness may seem reason-
able. However, as suggested below, some conduct deemed not unwel-
come may cause sexual harassment harm. 
The possibility that some sex-based workplace conduct may not 
cause harm has led some courts to assume that such conduct is welcome 
until proven otherwise. 66 This assumption takes an overly simplified 
view of such conduct.67 It suggests that a particular employee's willing-
ness to engage in sex-based conduct in the workplace justifies assuming 
that any employee may be open to an office romance until that em-
ployee makes clear that she is not. 68 Further, it suggests that an em-
ployee's possible openness to romance with one co-worker allows the 
assumption that the employee is open to romance with any co-worker 
until the employee makes clear that she is not. 69 
65. See Niloofar Nejat-Bina, Employers as Vigilant Chaperones Armed with Dating Waivers: 
The Intersection of Unwelcomeness and Employer Liability in Hostile Work Environment Sexual 
Harassment Law, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 325, 326 (1999) (noting prominent examples 
of successful workplace courtship, including that of Melinda French and her husband Bill Gates). 
66. See discussion infra Part III.B. Of course, this is the logical implication. See Nejat-Bina, 
supra note 65, at 330 (noting that the implication of requiring proof of unwelcomeness is to 
assume that sexual conduct was welcome). There is a difference between an employee who 
makes sexual advances that become harassing and an employee who harasses through sexual 
advances. That we cannot necessarily tell the difference between the two does not suggest that we 
should assume that all employees are merely making sexual advances that may become harassing. 
67. Some have criticized the general view harshly. See, e.g., Miranda Oshige, Note, What's 
Sex Got To Do with It?, 47 STAN. L. REv. 565, 577 (1995) ("The unwelcomeness requirement is 
gratuitous, punitive, and reflects some of society's most insidious and outdated stereotypes about 
women and sexual behavior."). 
68. Of course, this concern might be addressed if the employee's openness to romance with 
others was not treated as evidence of openness to romance to the subject harasser. See Juliano.{ 
supra note 63, at 1590 (suggesting that evidence regarding welcomeness be limited to conduct 
occurring between the plaintiff and harasser); Radford, supra note 48, at 505-06 (suggesting that 
evidence regarding welcomeness be limited to conduct occurring between the plaintiff and the 
harasser). 
69. See Benedet, supra note 61, at 140 (noting that the investigation of woman's sexual 
background in harassment cases is based on the notion that "[s]exual acts are ... essentially 
fungible for women, both as to the partner with whom they engage in them and as to the location 
in which they take place."); Bull, supra note 21, at 128 (noting that when evidence that plaintiff 
engaged in sexual relations with co-worker is deemed relevant to unwelcomeness the suggestion 
is made that the willingness to sleep with one co-worker implies a willingness to sleep with other 
co-workers); Juliano, supra note 63, at 1591 (noting that employee's desire for romance with one 
co-worker does not necessarily suggest the desire for romance with all co-workers); Joan S. 
Weiner, Note, Understanding Unwelcomeness in Sexual Harassment Law: Its History and a 
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The second explanation or justification for the unwelcomeness re-
quirement is that the requirement is necessary to protect the employer 
or the putative harasser or both. This stems from the twin notions that 
the employer must be responsible for the Title VII harm70 and that po-
tentially harassing conduct is only problematic when the victim com-
plains about it. 71 These notions suggest that it is not the nature of the 
harasser's conduct, but the response it engenders, that makes it prob-
lematic. Thus, knowledge that the conduct was unwelcome informs the 
harasser and might alert the employer that official corrective action 
needs to be taken. This would provide the factual background to prove 
that harm flowed from the continuation of the conduct. When viewed 
this way, the unwelcomeness inquiry would require that the mistaken 
putative harasser or the employer be given notice that the conduct is 
harassing or unwelcome, with such notice being provided when the vic-
tim tells the harasser that the conduct is problematic. 72 
Though the requirement that sexual harassment be unwelcome to be 
actionable may seem reasonable to some, the lack of judicial analysis 
regarding why all sexually harassing conduct must be unwelcome to 
support an actionable claim is problematic. 73 While the interpretation 
that courts have consistently given the Guidelines-and the implication 
that all actionable sexually harassing conduct must be unwelcome to be 
actionable-may be reasonable, it has not been rigorously analyzed and 
is not the only plausible interpretation of the Guidelines. For example, 
the Guidelines can be read as requiring merely that sexual advances, 
but not other potentially harassing conduct, be unwelcome to be action-
able. That sexual advances alone could be required to be unwelcome to 
be actionable is plausible precisely because welcome sexual advances 
could be innocuous precursors74 to a personal relationship that might or 
Proposal For Reform, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 631 (1997) ("Admission of these kinds of 
facts reflects the old-fashioned view that if a woman is willing to have sex with one man, she 
must be the type willing to have it with everyone."). 
70. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca 
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(noting that respondeat superior is a requirement of a sexual harassment claim). 
71. See Benedet, supra note 61, at 132 (suggesting that requiring proof of unwelcomeness 
assumes that the plaintiff consented to being harassed unless it is proved otherwise). 
72. Knowledge that the conduct was not welcome becomes imperative. See Radford, supra 
note 48, at 548 ("The rationale for this approach [of unwelcomeness] is that, because sexual 
interplay in the workplace is often ambiguous, the legal system should include protections against 
those who 'innocently' engage in sexual conduct."). 
73. This is similar to concerns that have been voiced about the Supreme Court's lack of 
explanation regarding why precisely sexual harassment is sex discrimination. See supra note 15 
and accompanying text. 
74. Of course, there may be a harm in making the advance. See generally Gertrud M. Frem-
ling & Richard A. Posner, Status Signaling and the Law, with Particular Application to Sexual 
Harassment, 147 U. PENN. L. REV. 1069, 1080-95 (1999) (suggesting that the advance may 
signal a differentiated status between the person making the advance and the subject of the ad-
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might not develop. 75 Conversely, requests for sexual favors in the 
workplace, whether unwelcome or not, can be viewed as always poten-
tially actionable because in the context of an employment relationship 
such a request may be troublesome in the office environment even when 
welcomed by the person propositioned. The Guidelines note that, under 
certain conditions, providing job benefits as a result of acquiescence to 
sexual favors can support a sexual harassment claim by an employee 
who was qualified to receive the job benefit but did not. 76 This suggests 
that implicitly linking job benefits to sex or sex-based activity can be 
problematic for the workplace even when the subject of the favoritism 
is not harmed by it. 77 Similarly, verbal or physical conduct of a sexual 
nature could be considered sufficiently inappropriate that such conduct 
could support a sexual harassment claim, whether unwelcome or not. 
As unwelcomeness' role in hostile work environment harassment is dis-
cussed below, it will become clear how verbal or physical conduct of a 
sexual nature may logically support a Title VII claim though the con-
duct is not unwelcome to the subject of the conduct. The fact that con-
duct is not deemed sexual harassment until it alters a plaintiff's terms of 
employment also supports the plausibility of the above suggestion. If 
terms of employment are altered as a result of conduct, the fact that the 
conduct was not unwelcome could be deemed irrelevant to whether Ti-
tle VII liability existed. 
This argument should not be viewed as a suggestion that this alter-
native reading of the Guidelines is the correct reading. The accepted 
vance that can lead to workplace problems); Vhay, supra note 15. 
75. Two factors support the possibility that the welcomeness requirement should be limited 
to sexual advances. First, a workplace in which employees are allowed to ask each other on dates 
as long as the request is not unwelcome, but are never allowed to ask each other for sexual fa-
vors or engage in conduct of a sexual nature does not seem particularly bizarre. In such a work-
place, employees would be allowed to attempt to begin a personal relationship in the workplace, 
but would not be allowed to make sexual demands or otherwise turn the workplace into a sexual-
ized one. Second, given that sexual harassment does not become actionable until the conduct 
alters the terms of an employee's employment, the EEOC may have assumed that even requests 
for sexual favors or conduct of a sexual nature that are not unwelcome can alter an employee's 
terms of employment or impair the employee's working atmosphere. 
76. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.ll(g) (2001) ("Where employment opportunities or benefits are 
granted because of an individual's submission to the employer's sexual advances or requests for 
sexual favors, the employer may be held liable for unlawful sex discrimination against other 
persons who were qualified for but denied that employment opportunity or benefit."). Without a 
clear suggestion that the submission to the advances must encompass the submission to unwel-
come advances, it is reasonable to suggest that the submission to welcome advances still may 
cause the harm to an employee who was denied a job benefit as a result of the submission to 
advances. Though the EEOC's Policy Guidance on Employer Liability under Title VII for Sexual 
Favoritism, N-915-048, clarifies this language somewhat in suggesting that the sexual favoritism 
must be rampant, it does not suggest that the claim will depend on the welcomeness of the con-
duct. See EEOC: Policy Guidance on Employer Liability for Sexual Favoritism Under Title VII, 
8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (EEOC Notice No. 915-048 (Jan. 12, 1990)). 
77. See infra notes 190-92 and accompanying text. 
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interpretation of the Guidelines-that all types of sexually harassing 
conduct must be unwelcome to be actionable-may be precisely what 
the EEOC intended. However, the accepted interpretation has yielded a 
received wisdom regarding the implications of the Guidelines that may 
be inconsistent with current Title VII jurisprudence. The lack of analy-
sis in adopting and maintaining the accepted interpretation may have led 
to the particular manner in which the Guidelines and the unwelcome-
ness requirement have been used by courts in sexual harassment litiga-
tion. By gravitating toward a view requiring that all conduct supporting 
a sexual harassment claim be unwelcome, many courts have endorsed a 
narrow view of sexual harassment and a broad view of unwelcomeness 
that may not serve Title VII well. This may have occurred, in part, 
because some courts, including the Supreme Court on occasion, have 
been willing to invest the EEOC Guidelines with almost as much import 
as Title VII itself, leading to a lack of reexamination of the implications 
that flow from the accepted interpretation of the Guidelines. 78 As fidel-
ity to the principles underlying Title VII may provide a different vision 
of the unwelcomeness requirement and the conduct that can support a 
sexual harassment claim, a reexamination of unwelcomeness is appro-
priate. However, before a reexamination can occur, one needs a work-
ing theory of unwelcomeness. Ours is that unwelcomeness stems from 
the notions that welcome conduct does not tend to cause harm and that 
harassers and employers need affirmative notice that conduct is harass-
ing before the employer is deemed responsible for subsequent similar 
conduct. 
B. Defining Unwelcomeness 
That conduct must be unwelcome to be actionable is clear; 79 what 
constitutes unwelcome conduct is not. Two issues arise in determining 
whether conduct is unwelcome for Title VII purposes. The first issue is 
how intensely unwelcome conduct must be to be considered unwelcome 
under the requirement. The second issue is whether unwelcomeness 
should be viewed from the plaintiff's perspective, the defendant's per-
78. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (noting the importance 
of the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 
(1975) (deference to EEOC interpretation of Title VII); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 
897, 903 n.7 (1982) (commenting on the influence of EEOC interpretation of Title VII); Paul 
Nicholas Monnin, Proving Welcomeness: The Admissibility of Evidence of Sexual History in 
Sexual Harassment Claims Under the 1994 Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 412, 48 
VAND. L. REV. 1155, 1163 (1995) (noting the influence of the EEOC Guidelines on courts). Of 
course, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), was a noticeable depar-
ture from this method of analysis. 
79. See Monnin, supra note 78, at 1168 ("After Meritor and the extension of the Court's 
imprimatur, the concept ofunwelcomeness is firmly entrenched in sexual harassment law."). 
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spective or an objective perspective. Courts have nof resolved either 
issue in any unified fashion. 80 
1. What is Unwelcome Conduct? 
Determining whether conduct is unwelcome is difficult. Though 
courts seem to have a general sense of what the unwelcomeness inquiry 
entails, they have been spare in enunciating unwelcomeness principles. 
For example, that unwelcome conduct must not have been encouraged 
or incited is one of the few long-standing rules of unwelcomeness. 81 
However, this common-sense rule can have widely different practical 
implications and may leave many situations unaddressed. For example, 
the rule can be read to focus on the harasser's belief regarding the wel-
comeness of the conduct. When read in this way, the rule would seem 
to deem conduct welcome if a putative harasser mistakenly believed his 
conduct had been encouraged, and would seem to apply even if a ha-
rasser had an idiosyncratic view of encouragement or incitement. 82 
Conversely, the rule could be assumed to focus on encouragement and 
incitement as a way to determine if the subject actually welcomed the 
conduct at the time it occurred, and therefore presumably was not 
harmed by the conduct. 83 However defined, the lack of clear guidance 
regarding a rule that is so commonly invoked is a problem. 
Regardless of its interpretation, the rule certainly leaves uncovered 
ambiguous situations in which no response to the conduct was made. 
So, where the subject of the harassment either attempts to ignore the 
conduct or declines to specifically address it, the rule seems to leave 
the default solution-that the conduct is not unwelcome-undisturbed. 
The same may be true when the harassing conduct occurs before the 
subject had any other interaction with the putative harasser. The point 
is not necessarily to demand more specific rules regarding unwelcome-
80. This is hardly surprising given that resort to common sense seems to guide the resolution 
of these issues. See Benedet, supra note 61, at 131 ("The content of the unwelcomeness require-
ment is being developed by the courts on an ad hoc basis, apparently by reference to judicial 
common sense."). 
81. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982) ("In order to consti-
tute harassment, this conduct must be unwelcome in the sense that the employee did not solicit or 
incite it, and in the sense that the employee regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive."); 
Radford, supra note 48, at 519 ("The generally accepted definition of 'unwelcome' conduct is 
conduct that the plaintiff did not solicit, invite, or incite and that was offensive or undesirable to 
the plaintiff."). 
82. Such a view can be used to suggest that conduct that would appear to be clearly unac-
ceptable may yet be desired. See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 214 F.3d 1082 (9'th Cir. 2000); 
Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991). 
83. This conventional way of viewing unwelcomeness causes concern in part because it 
begins to resemble the consent inquiry in rape cases. See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying 
text. 
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ness; rather, it is to appreciate that the lack of guidance regarding the 
precise parameters of unwelcomeness, combined with the EEOC's sug-
gestion that the unwelcomeness inquiry is context-driven, 84 allows 
courts to write on a relatively blank slate each time one examines un-
welcomeness, and that that freedom has created a patchwork of caselaw 
regarding unwelcomeness. 85 
Multiple approaches exist to determine whether conduct is unwel-
come, and each is defensible. Sex-related conduct, like all conduct, can 
be clearly welcome, clearly unwelcome or any shade in between. 86 How 
to treat possibly welcome conduct and possibly unwelcome conduct for 
sexual harassment purposes are open questions. Some courts have de-
fined welcome conduct to include all conduct except that which is spe-
cifically objected to by an employee; others have defined welcome con-
duct to include only that conduct that is expressly welcomed by an em-
ployee.87 
The most restrictive courts view the incite-or-encourage rule very 
broadly and seem to believe that literally any conduct is potentially 
welcome. 88 Thus, even in situations where plaintiffs have been horribly 
abused, some courts have deemed the victim's workplace behavior suf-
ficient to render the abuse welcome and to immunize the harassment 
visited upon her. 89 For example, in Reed v. Shepard, 00 the Court viewed 
the plaintiff's supposed exhibitionism, suggestive gift-giving and foul 
mouth as sufficient encouragement of sexually suggestive conduct that 
the conduct she received in response was deemed welcome. 91 The con-
duct she endured was extreme: 
84. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2001). 
85. For example, compare Henson, 602 F.2d at 903, with Brooks, 214 F.3d at 1082. 
86. See Radford, supra note 48, at 501 ("Sexual advances and conduct in the workplace 
appear in the same varieties as these guests-some invited, some not invited but happily ac-
cepted, some merely tolerated, and others actually rejected."). For example, note these four 
responses to an objectively offensive joke: 1) "that was hilarious, let me tell you one just like 
it," 2) "you should not tell jokes like that in the office," 3) silence and 4) "please do not tell 
jokes like that around me." The responses suggest that the joke can be categorized respectively 
as clearly welcome; possibly, but not clearly, welcome; possibly, but not clearly, unwelcome; 
and clearly unwelcome. 
87. Many commentators have suggested that courts presume that conduct is unwelcome 
unless clearly welcomed by the plaintiff and that the presumption should run in the opposite 
direction. See, e.g., Benedet, supra note 61, at 173 ("The element of unwelcomeness should be 
removed from the prima facie case, and the burden should be on the defendant to show that the 
plaintiff actually wanted the impugned conduct."); Radford, supra note 48, at 505 (suggesting 
that the burden of proving unwelcomeness shift to defendant who would then have to prove 
welcomeness). 
88. See Benedet, supra note 61, at 143 n.65 (detailing cases in which plaintiffs behavior 
was seen as justification for sexual harassment by co-workers). 
89. See Schultz, supra note 15, at 1730-32. 
90. 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991). 
91. Reed, 939 F.2d at 486-87, 491-92. 
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Plaintiff contends that she was handcuffed to the drunk tank and 
sally port doors, that she was subjected to suggestive remarks .. 
. , that conversations often centered around oral sex, that she 
was physically hit and punched in the kidneys, that her head 
was grabbed and forcefully placed in members laps, and that 
she was the subject of lewd jokes and remarks. She testified that 
she had chairs pulled out from under her, a cattle prod with an 
electrical shock was placed between her legs, and that they fre-
quently tickled her. She was placed in a laundry basket, hand-
cuffed inside an elevator, handcuffed to the toilet and her face 
pushed into the water, and maced. 92 
Though proof that this conduct occurred does not necessarily mean that 
a sexual harassment claim is proven, the notion that the conduct was 
actually welcome seems a strange conclusion at best. The willingness to 
allow terribly abusive behavior to be deemed welcome suggests that the 
Reed court and others like it deem conduct welcome unless unequivo-
cally stated to be unwelcome. 93 Otherwise, abusive conduct would al-
ways be deemed unwelcome.94 Those courts seem to confuse the notion 
that some welcome conduct may not yield Title VII harm with the no-
tion that any potentially harassing conduct that does not yield Title VII 
harm is potentially welcome. This misapplication of the unwelcomeness 
requirement seems to stem from the failure to realize that not all un-
92. !d. at 486. 
93. Unfortunately, some people need to be told explicitly that their conduct is not welcome. 
This may explain some courts' requirement that plaintiff show unambiguous unwelcomeness. See 
Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 532, 533 (N.D. Ill. 1988). The court stated 
that the: 
Plaintiff began working for Wolff on January 27, 1985. For the first few weeks, 
James, as he occasionally did with other female employees at the office, made sex-
ual overtures to-in the vernacular of the modern generation, 'came on to'-her. 
Although Plaintiff rejected these efforts, her initial rejections were neither un-
pleasant nor unambiguous, and gave James no reason to believe that his moves 
were unwelcome .... After one misguided act, in which he briefly fondled Plain-
tiff's breast and was reprimanded by her for doing so, he accepted his defeat and 
terminated all such conduct. 
Dockter, 684 F. Supp. at 533. It is unclear why anyone would view the unrequested fondling of a 
subordinate's breast as presumptively welcome merely because the subordinate has not specifi-
cally objected to prior conduct. 
However, other courts do not require such clear conduct. See Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 
915 F.2d 777, 784 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Where, as in the present case, the employee never verbally 
rejects the supervisor's sexual advances, yet there is no contention or evidence that the employee 
ever invited them, evidence that the employee consistently demonstrated her unalterable resis-
tance to all sexual advances is enough to establish their unwelcomeness. "). In Chamberlin, the 
plaintiff continually pulled away from her harasser when he touched her and changed the subject 
whenever the harasser made sexually inappropriate comments. See id. at 779-80. 
94. Unfortunately, such determinations may stem from courts' opinion of the plaintiff's 
character. See Schultz, supra note 15, at 1729 (noting that courts have often suggested that sexu-
ally harassing behavior was not unwelcome when the victim did not fit the court's vision of an 
appropriately demure victim). 
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welcome harassing conduct is sufficient to sustain a sexual harassment 
claim.95 
Other courts have suggested a more nuanced approach to unwel-
comeness that would allow a wider range of conduct to be considered 
unwelcome in the absence of statements of unwelcomeness and in the 
face of some workplace playfulness.% Thus, harassment that is a sub-
stantial overreaction to workplace playfulness is not viewed as auto-
matically welcome merely because the plaintiff demonstrated some re-
ceptivity to ribaldry. 97 In Lauro v. Tomkats, Inc., 98 the court noted that 
the plaintiff's use of foul language did not suggest that she welcomed 
all of the conduct she experienced in return. That conduct included be-
ing propositioned, screamed at, being called vulgar names by various 
people on a regular basis and being threatened with beatings. 99 How-
ever, the court noted that: 
the fact that Lauro might have willingly participated in the use 
of foul language does not foreclose the possibility that the har-
assment of which she complains was unwelcome. To so con-
clude would be to assume that as a result of Lauro's occasional 
use of foul language, she would as a matter of law have ap-
proved of the sexually explicit and offensive comments to which 
she was subjected. The Court declines to make such a formulaic 
and unsubstantiated inference. 100 
Similarly, in Nuri v. PRC, Inc., 101 the court deemed the transmittal of 
dirty jokes and the use of foul language insufficient to make requests 
for oral sex and repeated physical touchings of a sexual nature wel-
95. In Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991), the court might have felt compelled 
to find that sexual harassment had occurred if the conduct involved had been unwelcome. That 
may have been sufficient for it to pervert the unwelcomeness inquiry and find the conduct wel-
come. 
96. See Cuesta v. Texas Dep't of Crim. Justice, 805 F. Supp. 451, 456-57 (W.D. Tex. 
1991) (noting that though plaintiff did not initially object to somewhat problematic overtures, that 
she objected as soon as they became clearly inappropriate meant that they were unwelcome). 
97. See Nejat-Bina, supra note 65, at 333-34 ("An employee who engages in sexual behavior 
at work cannot 'cry foul' when her co-workers reciprocate, but the reciprocation should match 
the instigator's conduct in degree and kind. Otherwise, it may be considered unwelcome sexual 
harassment."). 
98. 9 F. Supp. 2d 863 (M.D. Tenn. 1998). 
99. Lauro, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 867. 
100. ld. at 872; see also Morgan v. Fellini's Pizza, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1309-10 (N.D. Ga. 
1999) (noting that use of foul language does not waive "that plaintiff's legal protections against 
unwelcome harassment"). However, in some situations, foul language and sex-related activities 
in the workplace can render potentially harassing conduct welcome. See Lucas v. S. Nassau 
Cmtys. Hasp., 54 F. Supp. 2d 141, 148 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that male hospital employee's 
discussion of sexual conquests and amorous activity at the workplace might render conduct he 
was subjected to welcome). 
101. 13 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (M.D. Ala. 1998). 
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come. 102 
Also, other courts have noted that a willingness to engage in sex-
related banter does not make other gender-based harassment welcome. 
In Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Division, General Motors Corp., 103 the 
Seventh Circuit determined that efforts to be "one of the boys" does not 
suggest that all manner of sexual harassment is welcome. 104 In that case, 
plaintiff's willingness to tell dirty jokes had been offered to demonstrate 
that the "campaign of harassment" she was subjected to, including nu-
merous gender-based insults, defacement of her work equipment, and 
gender-based jokes at her expense, was welcome; the offer was re-
jected. 105 Similarly, in Lewis v. McDade, 106 the subject workplace's 
sexually-charged nature was offered as proof that the abusive and de-
rogatory harassment directed specifically at women in the office was 
not unwelcome. 107 The Lewis court noted that sexual repartee that could 
yield welcome sexual repartee in return would not support the charac-
terization of the abusive gender-based conduct at issue as welcome. 108 
Thus, regardless of the office's general atmosphere, the specific har-
assment at issue was not welcome. 109 
One court has gone one step further and noted that conduct that rea-
sonably appears welcome may yet be unweicome. In Gray v. Tyson 
Foods, Inc., uo the court recognized that plaintiff's actions may have 
stemmed from the plaintiff's perceived need to go along to get along. 
The court noted the following: 
Although there was evidence that the plaintiff voluntarily par-
ticipated in the activity she now complains of and that she en-
102. /d. at 1301. The Nuri court stated that: 
/d. 
PRC's pointing to Nuri's participation in the general office banter, and her stating 
that she did not object to it, is not enough to support the conclusion that she was 
not subject to unwelcome conduct. Using foul language, or sending or receiving 
dirty jokes, does not waive the protections of Title VII. 
103. 32 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 1994). 
104. /d. at 1011. The Carr court stated that: 
/d. 
[e]ven if we ignore the question why 'unladylike' behavior should provoke not a 
vulgar response but a hostile, harassing response, and even if Carr's testimony that 
she talked and acted as she did in an effort to be 'one of the boys' is (despite its 
plausibility) discounted, her words and conduct cannot be compared to those of the 
men and used to justify their conduct and exonerate their employer. 
105. /d. at 1010-12. 
106. 54 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (N.D. Ga. 1999). 
107. Lewis, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 1336-37. 
108. That conduct included screaming and cursing at the female employees in the office, 
guaranteeing that they were put into demeaning positions in the office and hitting female employ-
ees. See id. at 1337. 
109. See id. at 1344. 
110. 46 F. Supp. 2d 948 (W.D. Mo. 1999). 
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joyed it, there was also evidence and reasonable inferences from 
the evidence supporting the conclusion that the complained 
about conduct was unwelcome. The jury could have concluded 
reasonably that a woman in the work environment existing at 
defendant's plant had to appear to enjoy participating in the hos-
tile conduct in order to maintain any status in that workplace. 
The jury could have concluded that despite plaintiff's involun-
tary participation, she, in fact, found the conduct offensive and 
unwelcome. 111 
Simply, when a workplace is so ingrained with harassment that the only 
reasonable course of conduct is to seem willing to join in the unwel-
come activity, the harassment may not be deemed welcome. 112 The 
Gray court's approach, while sensible, eviscerates the unwelcomeness 
requirement, by allowing a victim to shield her discomfort and then 
prove that the conduct involved was unwelcome. This would not pro-
vide the putative harasser any reason to believe that his behavior was 
inappropriate, given that the behavior might appear to be a measured 
response to a plaintiff who seemed willing to engage in sex-based or 
gender-based conduct. Arguably, the incite-or-encourage rule was de-
signed to immunize just such conduct. At a minimum, the unwelcome-
ness inquiry seems geared in part to protect against conduct that the 
plaintiff affirmatively seemed to welcome. While the Gray court's rule 
is not inconsistent with Title VII's principles, the rule alters the unwel-
comeness inquiry so much that it may make more sense to eliminate the 
unwelcomeness inquiry than to view it in this way. 
Precisely how unwelcomeness is to be defined remains an open 
question given the courts' lack of uniformity. The unwelcomeness in-
quiry is a contextual one during which courts may use all relevant fac-
tors, including whether the plaintiff's actions were reasonable responses 
to unwelcome conduct given the workplace atmosphere and whether the 
putative harasser's responses were reasonable, to determine if the con-
duct at issue was welcome. The uncertainty attending the substance of 
111. Gray, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 953. 
112. See Benedet, supra note 61, at 151 Benedet notes that: 
Ostracism for refusal to participate in sexual behavior at work may itself become a 
form of harassment ... It is therefore hardly surprising that plaintiffs may resign 
themselves to joining in [the behavior]. This may mean weathering the comments 
and advances good-naturedly, or it may mean more active participation. 
/d.; Bull, supra note 21, at 144-45 (noting that joining in banter can simply be an attempt to fit 
in, rather than an indication that such banter is welcome). If ostracism is not a form of harass-
ment, the worker suffering from it might have no recourse but to accept it. See Parkins v. Civil 
Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1039 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that ostracism by co-
workers may not constitute harm covered by Title VII); Drake v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 
134 F.3d 878, 882-85 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that ostracism by co-workers may not be action-
able). 
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the unwelcomeness inquiry is all the more troubling because the inquiry 
can be used to serve very different purposes. However, before examin-
ing those purposes and finalizing the content of the unwelcomeness in-
quiry, we must examine the perspective from which unwelcomeness 
should be viewed. 
2. From Whose Perspective? 
How precisely the unwelcomeness inquiry should be constructed 
may depend on the perspective from which unwelcomeness is analyzed. 
The three major perspectives from which welcomeness can be viewed 
are the plaintiff's subjective perspective, the putative harasser's subjec-
tive perspective and an objective perspective. 113 Each of these can be an 
appropriate perspective from which to view unwelcomeness, depending 
on what the unwelcomeness inquiry is supposed to add to the general 
sexual harassment inquiry114 (i.e., depending on whether the focus is to 
be on the harm to plaintiffs well-being, the defendant's knowledge of 
the inappropriateness of the conduct or the general appropriateness of 
sex-based or gender-based conduct in the workplace). 
If harm to plaintiff is the ultimate focus of sexual harassment and 
the intermediate focus of the unwelcomeness inquiry, viewing unwel-
comeness from plaintiffs subjective perspective is sensible. Whether 
the conduct was welcome by the plaintiff would be the key issue. Oth-
erwise, there would be no reason to believe that all conduct deemed not 
unwelcome does not cause harm. 115 Additionally, because the targets of 
the conduct may have different views than the perpetrator regarding its 
unwelcomeness, the target's view of the conduct would seem most im-
portant in addressing the harm flowing from such conduct. 116 
However, viewing unwelcomeness from the putative harasser's per-
spective is sensible if a defendant's intent to harass is important117 or if 
113. There are five total perspectives, if one includes the perspective of the reasonable person 
in plaintiff's position or the reasonable person in the harasser's position. However, I subsume 
them in the broad category of the objective perspective. Though this consolidation leaves some 
issues unexamined, those issues do not affect this Article's analysis. 
114. See Monnin, supra note 78, at 1165 (noting that courts have had difficulty determining 
the appropriate perspective from which unwelcomeness should be viewed). 
115. However, this might lead to the unwelcomeness inquiry being subsumed into sexual 
harassment's subjective offense inquiry. This would not be appropriate as unwelcomeness would 
merely provide an additional and possibly improper way to analyze subjective offense. 
116. A counter-argument set forth more fully below is that because subjective offense is 
already required for sexual harassment to be actionable, an unwelcomeness inquiry viewed from 
the plaintiff's perspective would be largely redundant. 
117. See Benedet, supra note 61, at 145-48 (noting that some courts find the putative ha-
rasser's knowledge of the unwelcomeness of his conduct important). Again, there is the concern 
that the inquiry will look quite a bit like the consent inquiry in rape, where the putative rapist's 
belief about consent can become important. See Nejat-Bina, supra note 65, at 350-52 (noting that 
requiring proof of unwelcomeness makes sexual harassment law look remarkably similar to rape 
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the defendant needs to know that his conduct was harassing. 118 Because 
the workplace is a setting in which men and women must interact and 
may annoy each other without the intent to do so, 119 an intent to harass 
may be considered necessary so that the workplace does not become an 
unmanageable minefield. 120 Unfortunately, some unintentional harass-
ment may merely be a manifestation of the differing ways that men and 
women interact. Because the same conduct can be unwelcome or wel-
come depending on who is subjected to it, the conduct itself is arguably 
not problematic unless the target indicates it is unwelcome. 121 Thus, as 
long as the conduct clearly would not be unwelcome to everyone sub-
ject to it, requiring that the harasser know that the conduct is unwel-
come by the target before the conduct is deemed harassing and action-
able may be sensible. Of course, the counter-argument is that it is pre-
cisely because potentially harassing conduct may be deemed harassing 
by some target that the harasser's perspective should be irrelevant in 
determining whether the conduct was unwelcome. 122 
law). 
118. Society may care about the intent to harass, not out of the desire to roughly equate sex-
ual harassment to rape, but because making sexual advances and other "non-abusive" forms of 
harassment may not be viewed as problematic-a view possibly at odds with Title VII. 
119. See Richard L. Wiener & Linda E. Hurt, Social Sexual Conduct At Work: How Do 
Workers Know When It Is Harassment and When It Is Not?, 34 CAL. W.L. REV. 53 (1997) 
(charting differences in how men and women react to behavior that may be harassing); Weiner, 
supra note 69, at 635 (noting a study in which men and women are shown to interpret behavior 
as harassing at very different rates). 
120. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (noting that 
Title VII is not a general civility code); Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (noting that sexual harassment "is not designed to purge the workplace of vulgarity"); 
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 805 F.2d 611 
(6th Cir. 1986). The Rabidue court noted that: 
It must never be forgotten that Title VII is the federal court mainstay in the strug-
gle for equal employment opportunity for the female workers of America. But it is 
quite different to claim that Title VII was designed to bring about a magical trans-
formation in the social mores of American workers. 
Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 430. 
121. In addition, the employer can argue that it cannot be expected to know that conduct is 
harassing unless the harasser knows that the conduct is harassing. 
122. Of course, harassers can have strange notions of what constitutes encouragement and 
welcomeness. In Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 214 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000), the court noted: 
At some point during the evening, Selvaggio approached Brooks as she was taking 
a call. He placed his hand on her stomach and commented on its softness and sexi-
ness. Brooks told Selvaggio to stop touching her and then forcefully pushed him 
away. Perhaps taking this as encouragement, Selvaggio later positioned himself be-
hind Brooks's chair, boxing her in against the communications console as she was 
taking another 911 call. He forced his hand underneath her sweater and bra to fon-
dle her bare breast. 
/d. at 1086. The notion that a harasser could feel encouraged by a command to stop is disturbing. 
While the court's statement could be read as a tongue-in-cheek suggestion at the sheer silliness of 
an argument suggesting that the plaintiff might have encouraged the conduct, the court's later 
suggestions that the implications of the attack could be dealt with easily may suggest otherwise. 
See id. at 1087 ("Despite the city's prompt remedial action, Brooks had trouble recovering from 
the incident."). The suggestion is that the mere fact that the harasser was fired should alleviate 
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Lastly, unwelcomeness may reasonably be viewed from an objective 
or societal perspective. Such a view would avoid the possible appor-
tionment of Title VII liability based on an ostensibly overly sensitive 
victim or an obtuse harasser. 123 From an objective perspective, certain 
conduct or courses of conduct could be deemed unacceptable, and con-
sidered unwelcome, regardless of the target's actual response to the 
conduct. 124 While other sexual harassment rules might render the con-
duct not actionable, the unwelcomeness doctrine would not. While this 
approach might cause some workplaces to lose their particular sexual 
character, if that character was defined in part by sexual harassment, 
eliminating such workplace atmospheres would probably not be particu-
larly problematic given Title VII's goals. 125 
The reasonableness of each perspective, combined with the lack of 
guidance by courts, has left the issue of perspective open. 126 For exam-
ple, in Gray v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 127 the court's suggestion that a plain-
tiff can hide her discomfort with conduct, yet still have it viewed as 
unwelcome, unabashedly suggests that unwelcomeness be viewed from 
the plaintiffs perspective. 128 However, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vin-
son, 129 the Supreme Court's commentary about unwelcomeness can sup-
port viewing unwelcomeness from any perspective. 130 There, the Court 
the effect of the sexual assault. 
123. The offense inquiry deals with this issue as well. However, for purposes of this section, 
we will explore the unwelcomeness inquiry as if the offense inquiry did not exist. 
124. This does not mean conduct that is not problematic to the victim will be subject to liabil-
ity. Other sexual harassment requirements ensure that the conduct complained of has actually 
harmed a plaintiff. 
125. Ultimate equality may require the elimination of the harassment in all workplaces. 
126. Some suggest that the issue of perspective has already been resolved. Radford, supra 
note 48, at 512-13. Radford notes that: 
Despite the somewhat confusing 'defense' language in Vinson, the combination of 
the Vinson opinion and the EEOC Policy Guidance clearly indicates that the Su-
preme Court and the EEOC believe that the target of sexual advances or conduct 
may not successfully bring an action for sexual harassment unless she can prove 
that she clearly indicated to the alleged harasser the unwelcomeness of his conduct. 
/d.; Weiner, supra note 69, at 626-28 (indicating that EEOC's view of unwelcomeness puts 
burden on plaintiff to demonstrate unwelcomeness to the alleged harasser). 
127. 46 F. Supp. 2d 948 (W.D. Mo. 1998). 
128. Similarly, in Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982), the Elev-
enth Circuit indicated that for conduct to be unwelcome, an employee must not solicit or incite 
harassment and that the employee must have been offended by the conduct. This arguably sug-
gests that unwelcomeness is viewed from the plaintiff's perspective in that the inquiry is focused 
on her and she must actually have been offended by the conduct. This could allow a plaintiff to 
deem the conduct involved unwelcome even though such was never indicated to the putative 
harasser. Of course, the Henson court may have viewed the unwelcomeness inquiry in that case 
as a timing issue, its point being that conduct may be deemed unwelcome if it occurs before the 
victim has an opportunity to indicate its unwelcomeness. If that is the case, Henson provides no 
additional insight on the perspective from which unwelcomeness should be viewed. 
129. 477 u.s. 57 (1986). 
130. Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that Meritor "leaves 
open the question of whose perspective-that of the harasser or that of the victim-should be 
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indicated that "[t]he correct inquiry is whether respondent by her con-
duct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome. "131 It 
is possible that the Court meant to suggest that the plaintiff's discomfort 
was a factual issue for the jury that could be proven by reference to her 
conduct. 132 However, the Court's determination that the unwelcomeness 
inquiry could be aided by the presentation of evidence regarding "com-
plainant's sexually provocative speech or dress" 133 suggests that unwel-
comeness, as a signal to cease the conduct, should be demonstrated to 
the putative harasser. 134 If so, the Court suggests that unwelcomeness 
could appropriately be viewed from the harasser's subjective perspec-
tive or the perspective of a reasonable person in the harasser's position. 
Though Vinson and Gray provide arguments that would allow a 
court to analyze unwelcomeness from whatever perspective it favored, 
the perspective from which unwelcomeness should be viewed may de-
pend on the purpose unwelcomeness is to serve in the broader sexual 
harassment inquiry. Thus, reference to other requirements of an action-
able sexual harassment claim may be useful before further sketching the 
outlines of the unwelcomeness inquiry. 
3. Unwelcomeness and Offense 
Examining other requirements of a sexual harassment claim to de-
termine the independent significance of the unwelcomeness requirement 
used in assessing 'unwelcomeness'"). 
131. Vinson, 471 U.S. at 68. 
132. See Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 565 (8th Cir. 1992) (suggest-
ing that a plaintiffs speech or dress is relevant to deciding if she viewed the conduct as unwel-
come). 
133. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 69. 
134. This aspect of the Court's decision has been widely criticized. See, e.g., Benedet, supra 
· note 61, at 142-45 (discussing the use of dress and demeanor to determine unwelcomeness); Bull, 
supra note 21, at 134-35 (noting generally that much seemingly irrelevant information has been 
admitted as relevant to the unwelcomeness issue); Juliano, supra note 63, at 1587-90 (assessing 
the use of dress, speech and demeanor to determine unwelcomeness); Radford, supra note 48, at 
505-06 (suggesting the inappropriateness of using speech, dress and demeanor to determine 
unwelcomeness). However, the Federal Rules of Evidence may soften the effect of the Court's 
decision. See Socks-Brunet v. Hirschvogel, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 113, 119 (S.D. Ohio 1999) 
("While relevant evidence is generally admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, evidence 
subject to Rule 412 is presumptively inadmissible, even when offered to disprove 'unwelcome-
ness' in a sexual harassment case."); Barta v. City & County of Honolulu, 169 F.R.D. 132, 137 
(D. Haw. 1996) (disallowing discovery of evidence of plaintiffs sex life); Weiner, supra note 
69, at 637-38 (noting that the revised Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence can stop the 
admission of the most problematic evidence); see also Monnin, supra note 78 (analyzing the 
interplay between sexual harassment and Federal Rule of Evidence 412). Unfortunately, the 
Court's decision may have other effects when courts allow defendants to probe sexual back-
grounds. See Sanchez v. Zahibi, 166 F.R.D. 500, 503 (D. N.M. 1996) (allowing limited discov-
ery of past sex-related activity even in the face of Federal Rule of Evidence 412); Oshige, supra 
note 67, at 581 (noting that a defense counsel's ability to probe to prove welcomeness may deter 
plaintiffs from filing meritorious harassment claims). 
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is advisable before constructing the content of the unwelcomeness in-
quiry. Actionable hostile work environment harassment must be subjec-
tively offensive to a plaintiff and objectively offensive to a person in 
plaintiffs position. 135 As the Supreme Court has noted: 
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an ob-
jectively hostile or abusive work environment-an environment 
that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive-is be-
yond Title VII's purview. Likewise, if the victim does not sub-
jectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct 
has not actually altered the conditions of the victim's employ-
ment, and there is no Title VII violation. 136 
That both offense and unwelcomeness are independently required sug-
gests that they should be viewed independently. 
Though both the unwelcomeness and offense requirements focus on 
harm or discomfort to the plaintiff, unwelcome conduct and offensive 
conduct are not coextensive. Assume that an employee makes a sexual 
advance toward a co-worker in a particularly inappropriate manner. 
The style of the advance, and hence the advance itself, may be offen-
sive even if the sentiment underlying the advance, and therefore the 
advance itself, was arguably not unwelcome. Conversely, an advance 
may be inoffensive, but undoubtedly unwelcome, whether the subject is 
interested in the propositioner or not. 137 Assume one co-worker sends a 
dozen red roses to the office of her co-worker with whom she is having 
a personal relationship. The gesture, particularly if seen by others, may 
be unwelcome, though not offensive, because the discreet nature of the 
relationship was highly prized by the recipient of the roses. Though 
subjective offense and welcomeness can cover different ground, 138 they 
are sufficiently related to be considered redundant in many situations. 139 
135. See Dey v. Colt Const. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1456-57 (7th Cir. 1994) (describing 
objective offense). 
136. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993). 
137. Imagine that a boyfriend sends a scantily clad male dancer to his girlfriend's office to 
deliver a strip-o-gram proposing marriage. Even if the girlfriend wants to marry her boyfriend, 
the strip-o-gram may be unwelcome for at least three reasons. First, the girlfriend may object to 
receiving strip-o-grams. Second, the girlfriend may not want to receive strip-o-grams at work. 
Third, the girlfriend may want to keep her private life completely separate from her work life 
such that no workplace intrusion of this or any other personal type is welcome. While the strip-o-
gram may not be welcome, it may not be offensive. Conversely, the strip-o-gram may be wel-
come in that the sentiment underlying the strip-o-gram may be welcome, while the strip-o-gram 
itself may be offensive. 
138. Benedet, supra note 61, at 134 ("[O]bjectively severe or pervasive sexual harassment is 
considered potentially consistent with welcomeness."); Monnin, supra note 78, at 1165 (noting 
that conduct can be "offensive or undesirable to the plaintiff, yet nonetheless 'welcomed' by her 
in the eyes of her harasser"). 
139. Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 833 (1991). Estrich stated that: 
the welcomeness inquiry is either utterly gratuitous or gratuitously punitive. It is 
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However, unless unwelcomeness is to be of extremely limited utility, it 
must serve a purpose as independent of subjective offense as possible. 
Viewing unwelcomeness from the plaintiff's perspective nearly 
eliminates the unwelcomeness requirement's effect. While it is possible 
that a plaintiff may be subjectively offended by welcome conduct, such 
would seem to be a very narrow and arguably confusing use of unwel-
comeness. Conversely, viewing unwelcomeness from the putative ha-
rasser's perspective affords the unwelcomeness requirement a greater 
impact by describing a broader, though still narrow set of cases (i.e., 
one in which the harasser believes objectively offensive conduct to be 
welcome). Though reasonable arguments exist to view unwelcomeness 
from any perspective, the unwelcomeness inquiry would seem to have 
its greatest practical import and significance when viewed from the ha-
rasser's subjective perspective or possibly from that of a reasonable 
person in the harasser's position. 
C. Assessing Unwelcomeness 
Based on the theories underlying unwelcomeness-that conduct may 
be welcome to one person, but unwelcome to another, 140 and that con-
duct must be unwelcome to cause harm-the unwelcomeness require-
ment is best conceived as requiring that the putative harasser know or 
should have known that the potentially harassing conduct was unwel-
come before it is deemed unwelcome. This construction of the require-
ment guarantees that harm to the plaintiff occurred-though it is under-
inclusive of situations where harm has occurred-because there will be 
little reason for the harasser to know that the conduct was unwelcome 
unless the conduct was actually unwelcome to the plaintiff, and guaran-
tees that the putative harasser has notice that the conduct was problem-
atic. Once the putative harasser knows or should have known that the 
conduct is harassing and unwelcome, the continuation of the conduct is 
necessarily harassing, and is actionable if the employee's terms of em-
ployment are actually or constructively altered as a result. Conversely, 
if the harasser had reason to be unclear that the potentially harassing 
conduct was unwelcome-possibly because the conduct was welcome-
the continuation of the conduct might not lead to harm, and the putative 
gratuitous when the environment is not proven objectively to be hostile, because an 
unwelcome environment which is not objectively hostile does not give rise to liabil-
ity in any event. It is gratuitously punitive if the environment is found objectively 
hostile, for in that case the employer can nonetheless escape the burden of address-
ing the issue, by portraying this particular woman as so base as to be unworthy of 
respect or decency. 
!d.; Nejat-Bina, supra note 65, at 347 (suggesting that the unwelcomeness requirement is super-
fluous). 
140. See supra notes 71-72. 
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harasser's conduct would not be deemed actionable. 
While this formulation of the unwelcomeness requirement is rea-
sonable given that the requirement must have some content, it is still 
troubling. When the unwelcomeness inquiry is viewed in this way, it 
appears to protect the conduct of a putative harasser who may have mis-
takenly not realized that his conduct was unwelcome (e.g., if the sub-
ject of the conduct did not react to the conduct or reacted to it with si-
lence). Allowing the harasser's mistake to shield the employer from 
liability treats sexual harassment somewhat similarly to rape. Although 
the Supreme Court, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 141 noted specifi-
cally that the consent inquiry in a rape case and the welcomeness in-
quiry in a sexual harassment suit are different, 142 they bear an uncom-
fortable similarity. 143 In neither rape nor sexual harassment cases is 
proof that sex or sex-based conduct occurred proof of harm, because 
the sexual conduct ostensibly can be consensual. Both voluntariness and 
unwelcomeness focus on consent. Indeed, the Vinson Court nearly said 
as much, even as it denied that the inquiries were identical. 144 Thus, 
unless the unwelcomeness requirement is applied carefully, some of the 
problems attending the consent inquiry in rape cases will attend the 
unwelcomeness inquiry in sexual harassment cases. 145 
However, no matter how it is structured, an unwelcomeness re-
quirement will put the burden of proving unwelcomeness on the plain-
tiff and create the presumption that sex-related workplace conduct is not 
unwelcome until proven otherwise. 146 That presumption suggests either 
141. 477 u.s. 57 (1986). 
142. That sex can be consensual vis-a-vis a rape prosecution does not mean that the sexual 
advances that preceded it were welcome in the employment context. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 68 
("The correct inquiry is whether respondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual 
advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in sexual intercourse was volun-
tary."). 
143. Benedet, supra note 61, at 126 ("Such an inquiry reveals several parallels between the 
approach of courts to sexual harassment claims and their traditional treatment of the criminal 
offense of rape."); Estrich, supra note 139, at 815. Estrich states that: 
These very same doctrines, unique in the criminal law, are becoming familiar tools 
in sexual harassment cases. The rules and prejudices have been borrowed almost 
wholesale from traditional rape law. The focus on the conduct of the woman-her 
reactions or lack of them, her resistance or lack of it-reappears with only the most 
minor changes. 
!d.; Juliano, supra note 63, at 1576-77 ("The factors considered bear a striking resemblance to 
factors formerly considered in rape cases."); Radford, supra note 48, at 516 (noting that courts 
following Vinson seem "to require nothing less than a clear and adamant 'no' on the plaintiff's 
part before believing that her communication of unwelcomeness was unambiguous"). 
144. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 69 ("While 'voluntariness' in the sense of consent is not a defense 
to such a [sexual harassment] claim, it does not follow that a complainant's sexually provocative 
speech or dress is irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether he or she found particular 
sexual advances unwelcome."). 
145. See Estrich, supra n01e 139, at 833. 
146. Benedet, supra note 61, at 132 (suggesting the existence of a presumption of consent to 
harassment in sexual harassment cases); Nejat-Bina, supra note 65, at 346 ("The presumption of 
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that a factfinder should believe that sex-based conduct in the workplace 
is actually welcome until proven otherwise, or that a sexual harassment 
case has not been proven unless the subject conduct is proven to be un-
welcome. These meanings are somewhat related because placing the 
burden to prove that sex-based workplace conduct is unwelcome on the 
plaintiff is more sensible if courts believe that most in society believe 
that sex-based workplace conduct is generally not unwelcome unless 
plaintiff indicated such to the putative harasser. 147 Conversely, presum-
ing that potentially harassing conduct is unwelcome unless the plaintiff 
initiated or encouraged the conduct at issue, or that the unwelcomeness 
inquiry be limited to those situations where the conduct at issue was 
openly welcome, may be just as reasonable. 148 That is, a presumption of 
unwelcomeness could follow proof of objectively offensive sex-based 
workplace conduct. 149 Nonetheless, courts have noted that proving un-
welcomeness is part of the plaintiff's prima facie case. 150 
Though no one wants to be harassed, 151 particularly given that ac-
welcomeness unfairly burdens victims; instead, the presumption should be that sexual conduct at 
work is unwelcome."); Oshige, supra note 67, at 590-91 (suggesting that welcomeness be an 
affirmative defense, rather than part of the plaintiff's proof); Vhay, supra note 15, at 344 ("Wel-
comeness in this context is most analogous to a justification for the defendant's act .... The 
plaintiff should not bear the burden of rebutting the defendant's affirmative defense in her prima 
facie case."). 
147. Unfortunately, the lack of clarity regarding the interpretation of unwelcome conduct may 
lead to the result that how the unwelcomeness inquiry ends may depend on where it starts. If sex-
based conduct is presumed unwelcome, more conduct will tend to be viewed as unwelcome re-
gardless of the standard used to determine unwelcomeness. Similarly, if conduct is presumed 
welcome, more conduct will tend to be viewed as welcome regardless of the standard used to 
determine unwelcomeness. 
148. Benedet, supra note 61, at 166 ("The idea of welcomeness is wholly inapplicable in 
cases where the conduct is not specifically solicited."); Mary Jo Shaney, Note, Perceptions of 
Harm: The Consent Defense in Sexual Harassment Cases, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1109, 1112 (1986) 
(suggesting that welcomeness "focus on whether the victim overtly consented to the sexual con-
duct rather than on whether the victim resisted a harasser's behavior"). 
149. Seemingly, this would be the tack taken if unwelcomeness were required in racial har-
assment cases. Potentially harassing race-based conduct would be assumed unwelcome unless 
proven otherwise. q. L. Camille Hebert, Sexual Harassment is Gender Harassment, 43 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 565, 577 (1995) (noting that unwelcomeness is generally presumed outside of the sexual 
harassment context). 
150. See, e.g., Splunge v. Shoney's, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1258, 1270 (M.D. Ala. 1994). 
151. Some have suggested that sexual harassment, by definition, is always unwelcome. Carr 
v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., 32 F.3d 1007, 1008 (7th Cir. 1994) ("'Welcome sexual harass-
ment' is an oxymoron."). While this is certainly true once conduct is defined as sexual harass-
ment, particular conduct may be harassing or not depending on context. Some conduct that could 
be deemed harassment could also be viewed as welcome in another context, even among the same 
participants. For example, if an employee has a sexual relationship with his boss, we can assume 
that sexual foreplay may occur in private, and may be welcome. This is so even if the subordi-
nate employee views sexual foreplay as unwelcome when his boss/girlfriend attempts foreplay at 
work. 
It is possible that a court would not consider such foreplay as unwelcome by virtue of the 
preexisting relationship between the boss and the subordinate. Because the definition of unwel-
come requires that conduct not be incited or invited, it may be that conduct of a sexual nature 
between certain people should never be considered unwelcome. At some point, this cannot be 
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tionable harassment entails the discriminatory provision of terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, whether someone is deemed to 
have been harassed depends, in part, on whether they appear to have 
acquiesced to the potentially harassing conduct. 152 When proving the 
lack of acquiescence becomes the key to recovery, employees become 
fair targets for gender-motivated conduct until putative harassers are 
told their conduct is unwelcome. This is problematic because, although 
sexual advances can be welcome in some contexts, 153 the suggestion that 
sex-based or gender-motivated conduct in the workplace should be con-
sidered welcome until the employee subjected to those advances objects 
may not be a reasonable one. 
The conduct that Amanda and Becky faced in our hypothetical situa-
tion raises just such problems. Though Amanda and Becky appear to 
face a workplace in which it is more difficult to get their jobs done be-
cause of their gender, they will need to confront the unwelcomeness 
requirement and its need for notice to the putative harasser. Regardless 
of whether X:YZ's workplace constitutes an actionable hostile work envi-
ronment, whether the answer should depend on whether the conduct is 
deemed unwelcome is the issue. As noted above, the unwelcomeness 
requirement is problematic even as it applies to face-to-face sexual har-
assment consisting largely of sexual advances and requests for sex. 
However, as sexual harassment moves farther away from its traditional 
sex-based moorings and toward a gender-based outlook, the unwel-
comeness requirement may become more difficult to apply to the kind 
of conduct that may cause harm similar to that in Becky's and 
Amanda's cases. Thus, the question is: Does the unwelcomeness re-
quirement continue to serve any appropriate function in the evolving 
sexual harassment inquiry? 
IV. UNWELCOMESNESS AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
When sexual harassment was first made cognizable and was thought 
largely to comprise sex-based conduct, requiring that sexual harassment 
be unwelcome stemmed from the notion that potentially harassing con-
duct might be enjoyed by employees, and therefore might not cause 
Title VII harm. 154 However, the unwelcomeness requirement fits rather 
uneasily with current sexual harassment law and its applicability to all 
true, as even sexual relations between married partners can become marital rape. 
152. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Bull, supra note 21, at 118. 
153. See Nejat-Bina, supra note 65, at 349 (noting that some have suggested that workplace 
conduct of a sexual nature may be welcome); see also Fremling & Posner, supra note 74, at 
1081 (noting that the workplace is an increasingly important site for courtship as most women 
are now entering the workforce before marriage). 
154. See Benedet, supra note 61, at 144-45; Bull, supra note 21, at 124. 
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gender-based conduct that can support sexual harassment claims. As 
gender harassment has become clearly actionable, sexual harassment 
law may have outgrown the unwelcomeness requirement. 
A. Unwelcomeness and Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment 
In quid pro quo harassment cases, the unwelcomeness requirement 
is largely irrelevant. Recent Supreme Court cases have made it clear 
that quid pro quo harassment requires that actual job detriment result 
directly from sexually harassing conduct. 155 Unless it causes actual job 
detriment, sexually harassing conduct, including a threat conditioning 
job benefits on acquiescence to harassment, is insufficient to support a 
quid pro quo case. 156 Were a supervisor to tell a subordinate, "You 
must have sex with me or you will be fired," the threat alone would not 
support a quid pro quo case until the subordinate was fired or suffered 
some other actual job detriment. 157 Though requiring unwelcomeness 
may have seemed sensible when quid pro quo harassment encompassed 
the conditioning of job benefits on sex and like conduct158-a situation 
in which the trade and the underlying conduct could, under limited cir-
cumstances, have been viewed as welcome-it makes little sense today 
given that quid pro quo harassment focuses on actual job detriment in-
flicted as a result of a refusal to acquiesce to sexual harassment. 159 
Constructing a scenario in which welcome conduct creates actual 
job detriment may be impossible. The closest scenario would seem to 
be one in which the continuation of conduct, which at one point was 
welcome, is made a term of employment, and then causes actual job 
detriment to the employee when the employee refuses to acquiesce in 
the continuation. For example, assume that an employee who previ-
ously had a voluntary and consensual affair with his boss is fired for 
refusing to continue the affair. If the result of the refusal to continue 
the conduct results in job detriment, either the conduct or the condition-
ing of continued employment on continuing the conduct would seem to 
have necessarily been unwelcome at the time the condition was placed 
on continued employment. Even if one argues that the harasser must 
have notice of the unwelcomeness, the refusal to continue the affair 
would seem to qualify as notice of unwelcomeness. Were the conduct 
155. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753 (1998). 
156. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754. 
157. /d. 
158. See Bryson v. Chicago State Univ., 96 F.3d 912, 915 (7th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that 
the conditioning of job benefits on sex was sufficient for quid pro quo case); Karibian v. Colum-
bia Univ., 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1994); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 186 (6th 
Cir. 1992) (suggesting that conditioning of benefits on sexual harassment is sufficient for quid 
pro quo case). 
159. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754. 
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welcome, the employee would presumably have engaged in the required 
conduct, particularly since his job was the cost of noncompliance. 160 
Whether the harassing conduct would have been welcome had it not 
been tied to job detriment surely cannot matter to whether a quid pro 
quo claim exists. 161 The fact that potentially harassing conduct was wel-
come in the past cannot mean it continues to be welcome even though it 
leads to actual job detriment. 162 Rather, potentially harassing conduct 
would always seem to be potentially unwelcome, and arguments that the 
conduct was welcome in the past should be largely irrelevant to deter-
mining whether it was welcome at the time it precipitated the actual job 
detriment. It appears impossible for a quid pro quo claim to be predi-
cated solely on welcome conduct, because the nature of a quid pro quo 
claim is such that when quid pro quo harm (i.e., actual job detriment) 
occurs, no argument exists that all of the conduct underlying the claim 
was welcome. 
Applying the unwelcomeness requirement to Becky's situation in 
our hypothetical suggests the requirement's irrelevance to, or the fact 
that unwelcomeness always exists in, quid pro quo cases. Becky's quid 
pro quo claim could be based on the notion that she was denied a pro-
motion, and the pay raise that came with it, because of her refusal to 
accept and participate in the sexually harassing atmosphere. Because 
her refusal to participate in the workplace atmosphere was recognized 
and used in part to deny her the promotion, even a strict standard of 
unwelcomeness requiring notice would seem to have been met in 
160. Cf. Bull, supra note 21, at 124. Bull states that: 
The Meritor standard is premised on a notion of welcomeness, that women wel-
come certain behavior by dressing or talking a certain way. While this logical in-
ference might make sense to some in the context of a hostile environment claim, it 
is untenable in the context of quid pro quo harassment. Clearly, no woman inten-
tionally provokes losing her job. 
/d.; Nejat-Bina, supra note 65, at 329 ("[I]n a quid pro quo case, a supervisor's sexual request is 
implicitly unwelcome and unwelcomeness is not a key element."). 
161. Were the mere conditioning of job benefits on harassment still considered to be quid pro 
quo harassment, one could argue, rather weakly, that requiring that an employee acquiesce to 
something that is not unwelcome does not cause any harm, and therefore should not be sanc-
tioned as sexual harassment. However, since the mere conditioning of job benefits on sexual 
harassment (i.e., unfulfilled threats, does not amount to quid pro quo sexual harassment that 
argument is no longer available). Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754. 
162. This argument is distinct from one that suggests that previously welcome conduct may 
not appear harassing precisely because it had previously been welcome. Assume that an employee 
who has historically been willing to plan office parties is now required to plan such parties. 
When she refuses, she is demoted. That the employee had no complaints about voluntarily plan-
ning such parties before does not mean that being required to plan parties is not unwelcome. The 
refusal to plan the parties suggests unwelcomeness. However, that the employee does not wel-
come being required to plan parties does not mean that the requirement is harassment; it may 
simply be annoying. See Galdieri-Ambrosini v. Nat'l Realty & Dev., 136 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 
1998) (noting that assignment of secretarial tasks is not gender-related discrimination when the 
secretary is the person assigned tasks and there is no indication that male secretaries would have 
been treated differently). 
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Becky's situation. Of course, an employer hardly needs notice that con-
duct leading to an adverse job action is unwelcome. This analysis, of 
course, relates only to the unwelcomeness question, and would not af-
fect XfZ's argument that the conduct Becky endured was not gender-
based harassment. 
B. Unwelcomeness and Hostile Work Environment Harassment 
The interplay between hostile work environment harassment and 
unwelcomeness is more complicated than that between unwelcomeness 
and quid pro quo harassment. The lack of a requirement of actual job 
detriment in the hostile work environment area makes the application of 
the unwelcomeness requirement to hostile work environment harass-
ment somewhat different. 163 As there need not be an adverse job action 
in the hostile work environment context, there need not be a refusal to 
acquiesce to harassment that necessarily creates notice of unwelcome-
ness, or any particular action by a supervisor that would be unques-
tionably unwelcome to all employees. Consequently, a hostile work 
environment may exist without notice being provided to the putative 
harasser or the employer that conduct is unwelcome. 
Over time, the hostile work environment claim has changed some-
what as non-sexual gender-based conduct has grown in importance in 
supporting hostile work environment claims. 164 As the style of conduct 
that may support a hostile work environment claim has broadened, 
workplace situations yielding hostile work environment claims may not 
appear as egregious as in earlier cases like Vinson. This can cause 
problems because the unwelcomeness requirement may appear to re-
quire that courts ignore conduct deemed not unwelcome when determin-
ing whether a hostile work environment has been proven. 
The type of conduct that may support a hostile work environment 
claim can be of a different nature than that which has historically sup-
ported a quid pro quo claim. The nature of the conduct supporting a 
163. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Meritor Savings Bank is the case 
in which the Supreme Court first recognized the hostile work environment claim was grounded 
on sex-based conduct. ld. Had the sex-based conduct alleged in Vinson-sexual advances, sexual 
propositions and sexual activity-somehow been actually welcome and no job detriment occurred, 
no Title VII claim would have been cognizable, because the situation would have presumably 
amounted to consensual sexual activity in the workplace having little or no bearing on plaintiffs 
employment. ld. at 68. Applying the unwelcomeness requirement seemed no less appropriate in 
the hostile work environment area than in the quid pro quo area, though the Supreme Court's 
suggestion that the plaintiffs dress was relevant to whether the conduct was unwelcome, and 
therefore supported a hostile work environment claim, may have been inappropriate. See id. at 
69. 
164. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 
1991) (allowing impersonal harassment through calendars, magazines and other media to support 
a hostile work environment claim). 
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prototypical sex-based quid pro quo case may afford a visceral response 
of unwelcomeness that has no parallel with respect to conduct that may 
support gender-based hostile work environment cases. Though Title VII 
harm may exist in either case, there is a difference between a demand 
to have sex with one's boss on pain of losing one's job, and constant 
gender-based joking and non-physical harassment at the hands of one's 
co-workers. 165 If, to be deemed unwelcome, conduct underlying a hos-
tile work environment claim must elicit a visceral response of unwel-
comeness similar to that which one would expect to accompany conduct 
supporting a quid pro quo case, the unwelcomeness requirement may be 
an inappropriate part of the hostile work environment landscape, be-
cause conduct that may be deemed not unwelcome may actually help 
create a work environment that causes Title VII harm, whether it is 
credited with doing so or not. 
This problem is even larger given that a hostile work environment 
need not literally be hostile to support a hostile work environment 
claim. A hostile work environment claim exists whenever an em-
ployee's terms of employment have been constructively altered by har-
assment because of her gender. 166 This may occur when a workplace is 
hostile, abusive, or of such a nature that it causes an employee to have 
an unreasonably more difficult time doing her job or advancing because 
of her gender. 167 For example, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 168 the 
plaintiff claimed that the company owner's conduct toward her and 
other female workers in the office created a hostile work environ-
ment.169 The owner's conduct included requiring female workers to re-
trieve coins from his pocket, implying that plaintiff had promised sex to 
a customer to close a deal, and suggesting that the plaintiff go to a mo-
tel to negotiate a raise with him. 170 Even though the plaintiff only 
claimed that she had suffered some, though not necessarily severe, psy-
chological harm, the owner's conduct was deemed sufficient to support 
a hostile work environment claim. 171 The harm of hostile work envi-
ronment harassment can be the toll that such harassment takes on an 
165. However, conduct may be harassing whether it would be viewed as mild in isolation and 
therefore not actionable, or severe in isolation and possibly actionable. Whether workplace con-
duct demonstrates that an employee is seen merely as a sex object, or as a subject of ridicule 
because of her sex, or as a member of a gender that is the subject of ridicule, it may create a 
hostile work environment if it is sufficiently severe or pervasive. See Nejat-Bina, supra note 65, 
at 349-50 (noting that seemingly harmless request for a date can suggest to employee that she is 
merely a sex object). 
166. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
167. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
168. 510 u.s. 17 (1993). 
169. /d. 
170. /d. at 19. 
171. /d. at 23 ("The effect on the employee's psychological well-being is, of course, relevant 
to determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive."). 
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employee's psyche, or any detrimental impact on the employee's work 
or working conditions. 172 Indeed, physical stress and mental distress, 
rather than actual job detriment, can be the only demonstrable effects of 
hostile work environment harassment. 173 While the conduct in Harris 
was crude, one could argue that it was potentially not unwelcome, de-
pending on the workplace in which the conduct occurred, or at least as 
welcome as conduct that other courts have deemed welcome. 174 The 
conduct Ms. Harris endured was treated as unwelcome, and she was not 
required to react as negatively as we would expect her to act to quid 
pro quo propositioning, though a clear visceral response might have 
been appropriate. 175 However, the issue is not fully resolved. The un-
welcomeness requirement may still require some response unequivo-
cally indicating unwelcomeness before such conduct is deemed unwel-
come. This is troubling because subtle gender-based conduct that may 
help create a workplace atmosphere may not yield, or appear to warrant 
a strong response, or any response at all. 
The fundamental problem underlying the interplay between unwel-
comeness and hostile work environment harassment is that all work-
place conduct is a part of the workplace atmosphere, whether such con-
duct elicits any response at all, or is deemed welcome or unwelcome. 
The concerns underlying unwelcomeness-proof of harm and notice to 
the harasser-are arguably irrelevant to many hostile work environment 
claims that focus on the workplace atmosphere and its effect on a plain-
tiffs ability to do her job, or to advance in her job. Whether one feels 
sufficiently harassed to complain may have little to do with whether it 
is actually more difficult to do one's job because of one's gender. The 
unwelcomeness requirement must be able to be appropriately applied to 
all types of conduct that can support hostile work environment claims to 
remain relevant. If the unwelcomeness requirement cannot be so ap-
plied, the old vision of unwelcomeness must yield to the new vision of 
hostile work environment. 
1. Hostile Work Environment Harassment and Undirected 
Conduct 
A workplace atmosphere can be shaped, in part, by conduct not di-
rected at any particular person, such as the posting of material in the 
workplace. 176 Thus, posting offensive gender-related material, such as 
172. /d. at 22. 
173. See Chambers, supra note 6, at 1631. 
174. Courts have found much more egregious conduct welcome. See supra notes 88-95 and 
accompanying text. 
175. Harris, 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
176. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 
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pinups, sexist commentary about the role of women in the workplace, 
and graffiti, would seem to shape the workplace atmosphere, and might 
help create a hostile work environment. 177 Requiring notice of the con-
duct's unwelcomeness is problematic. 
One issue is whether such conduct should be considered directed at 
everyone or no one. 178 If posted material is deemed to be directed at 
everyone, the unwelcomeness inquiry may be simplified, but might also 
be misguided. There may be little reason to believe that material posted 
inside one's workspace is directed at everyone unless the person posting 
the material intends it to be. For example, when material is posted in-
side someone's office, that material may be directed only at the indi-
vidual who posts it in the same way that the display of pictures of one's 
family can be directed solely at the individual in whose office the pic-
tures sit. That co-workers may be able to see the material may suggest 
that the material impacts the workplace atmosphere, but it hardly means 
that the material was actually directed at everyone. 179 Conversely, if the 
conduct is considered literally to be directed at no one, complaining 
about it-the mechanism that would provide notice-would make little 
sense. In order for the unwelcomeness requirement to serve its func-
tion, the conduct would seem required to be treated as if it were di-
rected at everyone, or at least at anyone who sees the material, even if 
it actually is not. 180 
Unless the person posting the material should have known of its 
unwelcomeness without being told, the putative plaintiff would need to 
tell the putative harasser that the posted material is unwelcome in order 
to have it support a hostile work environment claim. 181 Merely noting 
that the material could be offensive to some would not be sufficient to 
provide notice that the plaintiff viewed the material as unwelcome. 182 
This specific notice would be necessary because material can be wel-
come or unwelcome to a particular employee depending on that em-
1991) (noting that pinups and other ostensibly non-directed conduct can create hostile work 
environment); see also Balkin, supra note 21, at 2297 (noting that conduct that can help create a 
hostile work environment can be directed at a particular employee or no one at all); Christopher 
M. O'Connor, Note, Stop Harassing Her or We'll Both Sue: Bystander Injury Sexual Harass-
ment, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 501, 521-25 (1999) (noting that undirected conduct, including 
obscene pictures, can be the basis for Title VII claims). 
177. See Robinson, 160 F. Supp. at 1495 (detailing workplace conduct including defacement 
of work equipment and gender-based graffiti). 
178. Indeed, one commentator has suggested that actionable harassment be limited to conduct 
directed at someone. See Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment" Har-
assment Law Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627 (1997). 
179. See Balkin, supra note 21, at 2316 (discussing non-directed conduct and distinguishing 
speech for public consumption by the workplace masses and speech not for such consumption). 
180. However, even those who do not see the material may be affected by its existence if 
information about the posted material is discussed in the workplace. 
181. See Notice in Hostile Environment Discrimination Law, supra note 36, at 1977-82. 
182. See id. 
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ployee's reaction to it. However, whether or not the plaintiff alerts the 
putative harasser of the material's unwelcomeness, the posted material 
may still help create the workplace atmosphere and can help explain 
why it was more difficult to succeed in her job. Thus, the conduct 
should almost certainly be relevant to prove whether the workplace at-
mosphere amounts to a hostile work environment. 183 
Whenever conduct that is not complained about cannot be used to 
support a hostile work environment claim, a court or jury reviewing a 
sexual harassment case centered on that workplace's atmosphere does 
so based on incomplete material about the plaintiff's working condi-
tions. Conversely, allowing conduct that has not been deemed unwel-
come to support a hostile work environment claim, while sensible, ef-
fectively eliminates the unwelcomeness requirement. This clash may 
make eliminating the unwelcomeness requirement, as it applies to undi-
rected conduct, sensible. 
Applying the unwelcomeness requirement in this context presents 
plaintiff with an unpalatable choice: either complain about every bit of 
unwelcome conduct in the workplace or risk that such conduct will be 
deemed welcome and unable to support a hostile work environment 
claim. The first choice places a large onus on the plaintiff and raises 
the practical problem that the plaintiff is required to inform the harasser 
of discomfort with conduct that may be considered personal and not 
directed at the plaintiff. Given that single incidents are very rarely suf-
ficient to constitute hostile work environment harassment184 and the em-
ployer will often have an affirmative defense that may stop suits based 
on single instances of harassment, 185 complaining about single incidents 
of potentially harassing conduct amounts to complaining about conduct 
that does not constitute actionable harassment. Complaining about such 
conduct, if it is viewed as insubstantial, can be quite risky. Such com-
plaints may lead to unsavory situations such as being treated as an out-
casrt86 or as an overly sensitive inflexible person who cannot deal with 
183. See FED. R. Evm. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."). 
184. On occasion, single incidents might support liability. See Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 
625, 631 (2d Cir. 1997); Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1274 n.4 (7th Cir. 
1991); Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 1999) (R. Arnold, J., concur-
ring in judgment). 
185. As noted below, the affirmative defense stemming from Burlington Industries, Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), require 
that in most situations, the employer be required to have notice of prior harassment before it can 
be held liable for a hostile work environment. 
186. See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 214 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting plain-
tiff's complaint that she was ostracized after reporting harassment); Parkins v. Civil Constructors 
of III., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1031 (7th Cir. 1998) (complaining that ostracism was the result of a 
report of sexual harassment). 
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diverse people. Indeed, forcing a plaintiff to complain about conduct 
before it amounts to actionable harassment may be as likely to guaran-
tee that the conduct is never the subject of complaint as it is to encour-
age it to be the subject of complaint. 187 
We may consider Amanda's situation in our hypothetical. Requiring 
that Amanda complain about the posted material in her co-workers' 
semi-private office space or lose the ability to present such conduct in a 
hostile work environment case is a problematic choice. Amanda must 
make her decision whether to complain knowing that complaining will 
make her seem unable to get along with others-precisely the reason 
used to refuse to promote Becky. Though complaining may stop the 
posting of material, it may trigger unpalatable, but non-actionable con-
duct toward Amanda and end any chance that she may have to become a 
manager. 188 
2. Conduct Directed at Those Other Than Plaintiff 
Like undirected conduct, conduct directed at those other than the 
plaintiff can help shape a workplace atmosphere that may yield a hostile 
work environment claim. 189 By infecting the workplace with gender bias 
or gender-based hostility, conduct directed at those other than plaintiff 
may create an environment that is hostile, abusive, or more difficult to 
advance in because of gender. More specifically, conduct directed at 
others may yield a hostile work environment when either sexual favorit-
ism or third-party harassment has occurred. 190 It is unclear that the un-
187. In addition, it is difficult to believe that the Supreme Court wants employees to complain 
about every incident that could support a hostile work environment claim. See Oncale v. Sun-
downer Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (noting that Title VII is not a civility code). 
188. To be clear, I am not referring to retaliation, but to ostracism and beliefs about 
Amanda's personality that may make her advancement more difficult. See, e.g., Campbell v. 
Fla. Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26, 29 (Tenn. 1996) (describing ostracism that accompanied har-
assment complaint). 
189. See Howard v. Burns Bros., Inc., 149 F.3d 835, 838 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that har-
assment of other employees can "be relevant to show pervasiveness of the hostile environment"); 
Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (lOth Cir. 1987) ("The second question is 
whether incidents of sexual harassment directed at employees other than the plaintiff can be used 
as proof of the plaintiff's claim of a hostile work environment. The answer seems clear: one of 
the critical inquiries in a hostile environment claim must be the environment."); Van Jelgerhuis 
v. Mercury Fin. Co., 940 F. Supp. 1344, 1359 (S.D. Ind. 1996) ("Courts may consider third 
parties', or co-plaintiff's, impressions of and experiences in a work environment when a plaintiff 
maintains she was aware of defendant's sexual harassment of other employees in a workplace."); 
Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Auth., 4 F. Supp. 2d 144, 150-51 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting 
that workplace environment is created by action that may not be directed at the plaintiff); 
O'Connor, supra note 176, at 509-12 (citing cases in which courts have recognized the cogniza-
bility of bystander claims). 
190. Cf. O'Connor, supra note 176, at 517-18 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 409 U.S. 1059 
(1972), a case in which racial harassment of customers was used to support an employee's hostile 
work environment claim, and noting that bystander injury claims have been imbedded in racial 
hostile work environment claims since hostile work environment claims were first recognized). 
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welcomeness of the conduct does or should matter in either of these 
situations. 
Though individual instances of sexual favoritism are not action-
able, 191 rampant sexual favoritism in the workplace can create a hostile 
work environment when those affected by the favoritism suffer. 192 To 
whom the favoritism is directed is unimportant; that it created an at-
mosphere in which sexual availability was linked to advancement and 
other terms of employment is. 193 When a pattern develops such that it is 
clear that employees who advance are those who are or have been the 
supervisor's paramours and the advancement is related to the relation-
ship, a hostile work environment may exist. 194 Attempts to apply the 
unwelcomeness inquiry to sexual favoritism to make sure that the un-
welcomeness requirement is honored are fruitless. Applying it to the 
subject of the favoritism seems pointless, as that employee may wel-
come the favoritism or the underlying conduct or both. Additionally, 
whether the subject welcomes the sexual favoritism is irrelevant to 
whether the conduct has created a hostile environment for others. 195 The 
favoritism itself and the message it sends about the workplace may be 
sufficient to support a hostile work environment claim. 1% 
Likewise, applying the unwelcomeness inquiry to the plaintiff (i.e., 
requiring that plaintiff complain) appears pointless. The plaintiff would 
surely find the favoritism unwelcome because his job prospects were 
harmed by the conduct. In this way, the plaintiff in a sexual favoritism 
case can be likened to a quid pro quo plaintiff who may not have found 
the underlying harassing conduct unwelcome, but certainly found the 
191. See Hentosh v. Herman M. Finch Univ. of Health Sciences., 167 F.3d 1170, 1175 (7th 
Cir 1999); Elger v. Martin Mem'l Health Sys., Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d. 1351, 1353-54 (S.D. Fla. 
1998); Keenan v. Allan, 889 F. Supp. 1320, 1375 n.66 (E.D. Wash. 1995) (listing numerous 
cases). 
192. Even though providing benefits to paramours is not generally considered sexual harass-
ment, the EEOC has recognized that where such conduct fully infects the workplace ethos, a 
hostile work environment may exist. See EEOC: Policy Guide on Employer Liability for Sexual 
Favoritism Under Title VII, 8 Lab. Rei. Rep. (BNA) 405:6817, at 405:6819 (EEOC Notice No. 
915-048 (Jan. 12, 1990)). The EEOC Policy Guide states that: 
/d. 
If favoritism based upon the granting of sexual favors is widespread in a work-
place, both male and female colleagues who do not welcome this conduct can es-
tablish a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII regardless of whether 
any objectionable conduct is directed at them and regardless of whether those who 
were granted favorable treatment willingly bestowed the sexual favors. 
193. /d. 
194. If it was made clear that the only people who would get promotions in a particular office 
were those who had dated supervisors, a problem would exist. While such behavior would be 
insidious, more innocuous behavior could be a problem as well. Indeed, depending on the con-
text, the mere request for a date could suggest that the employee was a sex object who should be 
treated as such. See Nejat-Bina, supra note 65, at 350 n.186. 
195. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text. 
196. See id. 
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inability to advance because of gender-based conduct unwelcome. Addi-
tionally, there may be literally nothing to complain about. Individual 
acts of sexual favoritism may not merely be tolerated by the EEOC, but 
may not even be considered individual acts of harassment. 197 Only when 
the favoritism becomes systematic and pervasive does the overall con-
duct appear to become actionable. 198 However, complaining only after 
the favoritism is rampant would not seem to give timely notice that ear-
lier instances of favoritism were unwelcome. Seemingly, the unwel-
comeness requirement must be severely altered or abandoned as it ap-
plies to sexual favoritism. 
Third-party harassment, like sexual favoritism, can be evidence of a 
hostile work environment, and the unwelcomeness inquiry may be simi-
larly difficult to apply to it. 199 In Leibovitz v. New York City Transit 
Authority,200 the court allowed suit based almost exclusively on third-
party harassment. 201 The plaintiff did not work in the area where the 
harassment occurred and had not been a direct witness to much, if any, 
of the harassment. 202 While the targets of the harassment worked at the 
Transit Authority, they did not work directly with the plaintiff and were 
not friends of the plaintiff. 203 After the plaintiff learned of the third-
party harassment, she reported it to Transit Authority personnel, who 
did little to correct the situation. 204 The jury determined that the Transit 
Authority's response indicated a deliberate indifference to plaintiff's 
"right to a gender-bias-free environment" and that the subject work-
place was so permeated with discriminatory sexual behavior that "it 
altered the conditions of her own employment, and created an abusive 
197. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
198. See id. 
199. See O'Connor, supra note 176, at 544-45 (noting generally that the bystander cause of 
action follows from more traditional hostile work environment cases by merely recognizing that 
harassment against anyone can lead to effects on the entire workplace atmosphere). 
200. 4 F. Supp. 2d 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). 
201. The theory of recovery is simple. See Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Auth., 4 F. 
Supp. 2d 144, 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Plaintiff suffered emotional trauma. The trauma was 
directly traceable to the sexually harassing environment in her workplace. She sought relief 
through her employer; it was either denied or delayed. She has established constitutional stand-
ing."). Liebovitz was reversed on the grounds that the plaintiff's workplace or working condi-
tions were not hostile. See Liebovitz v. New York City Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 179, 190 (2d 
Cir. 2001). However, the Second Circuit continued to note that claims based in part on harass-
ment by others could be cognizable. See Liebovitz, 252 F.3d at 190. 
202. See Leibovitz, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 146 ("She was never discriminated against on the basis 
of sex, nor was she personally the target of inappropriate sexual behavior. There was, however, 
evidence of sexual harassment of other women in her shop that caused her emotional distress."). 
The court made the general point that courts have recognized that someone who has not been the 
object of harassment can claim that a hostile work environment existed. See id. at 151. 
203. See id. at 146 ("It was conceded that much of the alleged harassment did not occur in 
plaintiff's immediate vicinity and much of what she knew about the situation was second- or 
third-hand."). 
204. !d. at 147. 
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working environment for her. "205 Whether the Leibovitz opinion will 
herald a trend or be viewed as an outlier is unclear. 206 However, the 
theory underlying it is the well-established notion that conduct not di-
rected at a plaintiff can help create an atmosphere that may yield a hos-
tile work environment claim. 207 
The unwelcomeness requirement does not adapt well to claims 
based on third-party conduct. The first problem is determining whether 
the focus should be the plaintiff's reaction to the conduct or the target's 
reaction. A hostile work environment claim depends on whether the 
plaintiff's conditions of employment have been discriminatorily altered 
because of plaintiff's gender.208 Thus, if the unwelcomeness inquiry 
applies at all, it should focus on whether the plaintiff found the conduct 
unwelcome, rather than on whether the subject of the conduct found it 
unwelcome. Plaintiff's harm may be related to her belief that the har-
assing conduct may eventually be aimed at her or the belief that the 
conduct devalues one gender such that all workers of that gender, in-
cluding plaintiff, have a more difficult time doing their job. Though 
plaintiff's concern may be most credible and reasonable if the target of 
the conduct finds it unwelcome-because it would suggest that the puta-
tive harasser will engage in harassing conduct though it causes discom-
fort to the subject of the conduct-plaintiff's fears may still be reason-
able even if the target finds the conduct welcome.209 As different people 
can find conduct unwelcome or not based on personal proclivities,210 it 
should hardly be surprising that a target of potentially harassing con-
duct might not find the conduct unwelcome while a co-worker would. 
However, there may be a limited situation in which the subject's re-
action to the conduct is dispositive. One focus of the unwelcomeness 
inquiry in a third-party harassment case presumably may be on either 
205. ld. 
206. Some commentators have challenged the particulars of the ruling. See, e.g., L. Robert 
Guenthner III, Who is the Victim Here?: Vicarious Sexual Harassment After Leibovitz v. New 
York City Transit Authority, 55 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 299, 314 (1999) (advocating 
limiting third-party claims to situations where the plaintiff has witnessed the harassment and is a 
member of the class of persons harassed). Liebovitz has been reversed, but the general cause of 
action stands. 
207. See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (lOth Cir. 1987) (noting that the 
courts addressing the issue had determined that the harassment of third parties was relevant to a 
plaintiff's claim of harassment); Shepard v. Frontier Communications Serv., Inc., 92 F. Supp. 
2d 279, 288-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("A claim for hostile work environment, however, does not 
require that the harassing conduct be directed at the person bringing suit .... Restricting claims 
only to those to whom the harassment occurred personally would unduly limit the scope of the 
provision."); Waterson v. Plank Road Motel Corp., 43 F. Supp. 2d 284, 288 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(noting that third-party harassment can be relevant to creating a hostile work environment). 
208. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
209. In Leibovitz, the underlying conduct did not appear to be welcome. See Leibovitz, 4 F. 
Supp. 2d at 146-47. 
210. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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whether the plaintiff found the harassment of others in the workplace 
unwelcome or whether the plaintiff would have found the conduct un-
welcome had it been directed at her. When the focus is plaintiffs con-
cern about the harassment of others, the subject's reaction to the con-
duct may inform the issue. That is, if the subject does not find the con-
duct unwelcome, the complaint cannot rest on the notion that the plain-
tiff was damaged by seeing harm to others, as no one was harassed. 
Conversely, when the focus is whether plaintiff would have found the 
conduct unwelcome had it been directed at her, whether the subject 
found the conduct unwelcome would be irrelevant. Of course, much of 
the discussion above may be purely academic if unwelcomeness is to be 
reviewed solely from the putative harasser's perspective. 
Demonstrating that the harasser knew or should have known that 
the conduct was unwelcome is also tricky in the third-party harassment 
context. Because the conduct is not directed at plaintiff and the putative 
harasser is not likely to know that the conduct was unwelcome to some-
one he has not met, the requirement would seem to require that the 
plaintiff tell the putative harasser or the employer that the conduct 
would be unwelcome by plaintiff had it been directed at plaintiff. Of 
course, unless the target of the conduct also found the conduct unwel-
come, the typical and appropriate response might be, "so what." The 
requirement that a plaintiff complain about all conduct that is unwel-
come, even if it would be somewhat irrational to complain at the time it 
occurred raises the same concern as above-that the plaintiff may be-
come subject to non-actionable but problematic conduct after complain-
ing about conduct that is not actionable. 
Requiring notice in this context seems strange. Assume that a su-
pervisor treats his secretary in an objectively offensive and gender-
specific manner, but that the secretary has not indicated that the con-
duct is unwelcome. This would not necessarily be surprising given that 
even consensual and voluntary relationships may yield behavior that 
may appear gendered and offensive from outside of the relationship, but 
may not be unwelcome to those inside of the relationship.211 Assume 
that the secretary sees the conduct as relatively harmless gender-based 
playfulness that will stop if she requests. 212 The supervisor is likely 
211. Of course, inappropriate conduct can occur in intimate relationships. See Benedet, supra 
note 61, at 162-63 ("As the cases discussed above indicate, however, a good deal of the conduct 
ultimately considered welcome is equally inappropriate outside the workplace, even in the con-
text of an otherwise mutual intimate relationship."). 
212. Some people find playfulness flattering, regardless of possible future implications. See 
Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 913 F.2d 456, 460 n.4 (7th Cir. 1990). The Dockter 
court stated that: 
Ms. Rosenburg worked for five months as an Account Executive for Rudolf Wolff. 
She testified that Gannon called her at home on a number of occasions to ask her 
out to dinner-and that she went to dinner with him one time. Ms. Rosenburg also 
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concerned about whether the secretary finds the conduct unwelcome, 
not whether a different worker would find the conduct unwelcome were 
it directed at her. Of course, even if the target were clear that the con-
duct was unwelcome, that would not provide notice to the putative ha-
rasser that a third-party plaintiff found the conduct unwelcome. Simply, 
there may be no reason for the harasser to know or suspect that the 
conduct was unwelcome unless he was specifically told that by the 
plaintiff. 
If the unwelcomeness requirement is to protect the putative harasser 
and the employer, it serves no function if the plaintiff is not required to 
tell the putative harasser about the discomfort. Nonetheless, whether 
the putative harasser is informed or not, the conduct may create a 
workplace atmosphere in which a willingness to accede to inappropriate 
gendered conduct is or seems to be a means to advancement. 213 An em-
ployee who fears the gender-based conduct that may attend a sex-
infused workplace or does not function as well in such a workplace 
should not have to endure discriminatory conditions of employment that 
may come with working in such a workplace merely because the har-
assment has not yet been visited on her or she has not spoken up about 
conduct that has not been aimed at her. Simply, a hostile work envi-
ronment may actually exist for the plaintiff, but based in part on con-
duct deemed not unwelcome under the current unwelcomeness require-
ment. 
The unwelcomeness inquiry is clearly in tension with hostile work 
environment harassment based on conduct directed at others. In the 
sexual favoritism context, the EEOC is likely willing to ignore the un-
welcomeness requirement or presume it proved once the conduct is per-
vasive. In third-party harassment cases, courts have acknowledged that 
such conduct can support a hostile work environment claim without 
analyzing the unwelcomeness requirement. 214 Rather than ignore the 
requirement, courts should recognize that the unwelcomeness require-
ment should not apply at all in these situations. 
3. Conduct Directed at Plaintiff 
Though the unwelcomeness requirement's supposed utility is most 
testified that Gannon would attempt to hold her hand at work, but she found it flat-
tering. Finally, Ms. Rosenburg did not believe that she had been sexually harassed 
by Gannon. 
Dockter, 913 F.2d at 460. 
213. Of course, such conduct may never be meaningfully welcome in such situations. Cf. 
Estrich, supra note 139, at 831 ("[T]here is no such thing as truly 'welcome' sex between a male 
boss and a female employee who needs her job."). 
214. See, e.g., Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Auth., 4 F. Supp. 2d 144 (E.D.N.Y. 
1998). 
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easily seen with respect to sex-based conduct directed at a plaintiff, 
some of the most severe practical problems with the unwelcomeness 
requirement arise when it is applied to such conduct. While conduct not 
directed at a plaintiff may not be expected to conform to the unwel-
comeness inquiry precisely because it is so different from the traditional 
harassment to which the inquiry has been applied, conduct that is di-
rected at plaintiff does seem sufficiently similar to traditional harass-
ment for us to expect the unwelcomeness inquiry to apply. Nonetheless, 
there is an inherent conflict between the unwelcomeness inquiry and 
hostile work environment harassment in this situation. Seemingly wel-
come conduct can harm an employee's terms of employment when the 
discriminatory nature of an employee's working conditions is unrelated 
to whether the conduct creating the conditions is unwelcome. 
The problem is most pronounced when the conduct is not intention-
ally hurtful to the plaintiff and might not be viewed as hurtful by many 
to whom similar conduct has been directed. For example, assume that, 
like in our hypothetical, the female managers are expected, but not re-
quired, to plan office birthday parties, office luncheons and firm re-
treats. The expectation that these tasks will be done by women reflects 
the firm's and arguably society's vision of women as nurturers who, in 
addition to their assigned jobs, will help make the workplace a more 
humane place. 215 The tasks are not considered work duties when promo-
tions are determined, but may shape the company's opinion of a female 
manager's willingness to be a team player. 
The expectation that such tasks be done by women may not appear 
objectionable or unwelcome to particular female employees or even to 
substantial numbers of female employees precisely because it reflects 
societal gender bias, and could be considered too insignificant to merit 
serious Title VII concern. 216 Indeed, some of the female managers who 
are expected to engage in such tasks may simply not care about the 
tasks or their implications. However, when such conduct combines with 
other conduct that sends the message that women employees are not as 
highly valued as their male colleagues, or can be treated differently 
based on societal gender stereotypes, the atmosphere can make a par-
ticular employee's job more difficult to do or advancement more diffi-
215. The notion that refuge in familiar sex roles may cause problems is not new. See Vhay, 
supra note 15, at 341. Vhay cites to Barbara Gutek and notes: 
/d. 
[M]any men are uncomfortable with women in a work role, and as a result many 
revert to familiar sex roles. Regardless of the reason, however, when sex roles are 
injected into the workplace, sexual expressions often follow. When these expres-
sions lack mutuality and present a barrier to work, they become harassment. 
216. For a general discussion of what is significant enough to constitute a change in terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment, see Beiner, supra note 28. White, supra note 28. 
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cult to obtain because of gender.217 Were such conduct severe or perva-
sive enough to constructively alter the terms of an employee's employ-
ment, it would seem, by definition, to create a hostile work environ-
ment, but for the unwelcomeness requirement. 
Application of the unwelcomeness inquiry to this conduct would re-
quire that the plaintiff complain about the gendered nature of the party-
planning roles. Whether the party-planning expectations resulted from 
firm culture, or from signals given by supervisors or the head of the 
office, the plaintiff would have to tell a supervisor or the head of the 
firm that expecting female, but not male, managers to plan parties, 
luncheons and retreats is inappropriate. The danger of such a complaint 
is particularly acute if some female managers do not view the conduct 
as unwelcome. While the appropriate solution might seem to be to let 
the complaining manager decline to plan luncheons, the complaint itself 
may lead the employee to be viewed as someone who borrows trouble 
and is not appropriate for advancement. The putative plaintiff's work-
place comfort may decline, but not in an actionable way, when treat-
ment by co-workers and her likelihood of advancement is recalibrated 
based on her new reputation.218 Not surprisingly, it may be more sensi-
ble to keep quiet. 
Keeping quiet is problematic, particularly because the signal taken 
from the unwillingness to tell a supervisor that conduct is unwelcome 
may be that the conduct is welcome, rather than that it is not worth the 
potential price to tell the supervisor that the conduct is unwelcome. 
Accepting the harassment makes it appear non-problematic and suscep-
tible to repetition; telling the harasser to stop risks other problems, 
such as making an enemy or being labeled unfriendly or overly sensi-
tive. While these risks may not seem to be substantial, they are. To the 
extent that the Supreme Court has suggested that a personal vendetta 
against someone may qualify as a non-discriminatory reason to fire 
them, making an enemy in the workplace can be job-threatening. 219 Ig-
noring the conduct and bearing it may be wise even though the result 
may be an increasingly uncomfortable workplace for the employee. 220 
This hardly advances Title VII's goals. 
217. This does not suggest that merely treating women and men differently in the workplace 
automatically results in sexual harassment. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 
U.S. 75, 81 (1997) (noting generally that the different ways that men and women interact in the 
workplace will not usually support hostile work environment harassment). Rather, it is that such 
behavior, depending on its nature, can result in a hostile work environment. 
218. See, e.g., Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting poor 
treatment following harassment complaints). 
219. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Jennings v. Tinley Park 
Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 146, 864 F.2d 1368 (7th Cir. 1988). 
220. See, e.g., Gray v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 948 (W.D. Mo. 1999). 
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V. RESOLVING THE TENSION BETWEEN UNWELCOMENESS AND 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 
When sexual harassment was characterized by sexual demands and 
conduct accompanying highly sexualized workplaces, the harm of sex-
ual harassment stemmed from the plaintiffs negative reaction to the 
conduct, and the unwelcomeness requirement may have fit. Whether the 
plaintiff actually welcomed the conduct seemed relevant because if the 
plaintiff welcomed the conduct, the employee's terms, conditions and 
privileges of employment would not have been altered to the em-
ployee's detriment by the conduct. While many quarreled with how 
courts determined that conduct was welcome and have suggested that 
the unwelcomeness requirement should not have existed even under the 
old vision, the theory of unwelcomeness appeared to mirror the theory 
of sexual harassment harm. 221 However, the evolution of sexual harass-
ment has changed the relationship between unwelcomeness and sexual 
harassment harm. 
Sexual harassment now focuses squarely on harassing conduct that 
causes Title VII harm-the discriminatory provision of terms, condi-
tions and privileges of employment because of sex. 222 As has been ar-
gued elsewhere, sexual harassment can often be thought of merely as 
sex discrimination where the conduct underlying it is harassing.223 
When sexual harassment focuses squarely on ali aspects of harm to an 
employee's terms of employment, much of the theoretical justification 
for the unwelcomeness requirement-even when narrowly applied-
vanishes. The theory of sexual harassment harm no longer mirrors the 
theory of unwelcomeness. 
The unwelcomeness requirement's two possibly appropriate pur-
poses-guaranteeing that harm has occurred and providing notice-are 
already served by other features of sexual harassment law. The harm 
element is served by the requirement that plaintiff's terms, conditions 
or privileges of employment be altered or provided in a discriminatory 
manner and by the objective and subjective offense inquiries.224 The 
notice-serving function has been supplanted by the affirmative defense 
221. Not surprisingly, many have suggested that unwelcomeness' use be sharply curtailed or 
eliminated completely. Benedet, supra note 61, at 174 ("Welcomeness should only be invoked in 
the unusual case in which a hostile environment sexual harassment claim is based on sexual 
intercourse or related behavior and where the defendant can establish that the impugned conduct 
was mutual, consensual, and unaffected by workplace hierarchies."); Estrich, supra note 139, at 
858 ("The 'welcomeness' inquiry should be eliminated in both quid pro quo and hostile environ-
ment cases, because the additional requirements of proof in both types of cases make the wel-
comeness inquiry doctrinally gratuitous and personally humiliating for women."). 
222. See generally Chambers, supra note 6. 
223. See generally id. 
224. See discussion supra Part III.B.3. 
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to sexual harassment detailed in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth225 
and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 226 applicable to supervisor harass-
ment, and the knew or should have known standard, applicable to non-
supervisor harassment.227 Given that the employer, not the putative ha-
rasser, is liable under Title VII, notice is necessary only so that the 
employer can remedy the harassing situation. 228 The affirmative defense 
focuses on the employer's culpability or complicity in failing to detect 
or remedy the subject harassment. 229 By requiring that the employer 
provide some reasonable method for employees to complain about sex-
ual harassment and the employee not unreasonably refuse to use the 
system, the defense allows a vigilant employer to detect a pattern of 
harassment. While this affirmative defense is certainly not specifically 
addressed to the unwelcomeness inquiry, it encourages employers to 
construct responsive complaint systems that provide precisely the notice 
that the unwelcomeness requirement ostensibly provides. 
To be clear, this Article is critical of the notice-serving function 
that the unwelcomeness requirement serves and argues that notice 
should not be required in many circumstances. However, in situations 
where requiring notice is appropriate, it is already served by defenses 
the employer already has, obviating the need for the unwelcomeness 
requirement. 230 Of course, putting the onus of ferreting out problematic 
conduct on the employer will likely cause employers to police work-
place conduct. 231 However, because the employer is the liable party 
under Title VII, that an employer may be vigilant regarding Title VII 
violations is hardly surprising. 232 While this may cause concern to those 
who believe that hostile work environment jurisprudence already vio-
lates the First Amendment in some respects, 233 those issues are outside 
225. 524 u.s. 742 (1998). 
226. 524 u.s. 775 (1998). 
227. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
228. While some might suggest that notice is important so that the harasser will know to stop 
because of sanctions he might face from his employer, the employer's policy on disciplining 
employees may or may not provide that notice of unwelcomeness is important. Whether such a 
policy requires notice may be a matter of fairness, but is not relevant to the unwelcomeness 
requirement's notice-serving function. 
229. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775; Ellenh, 524 U.S. at 742. 
230. Where the unwelcomeness requirement or the affirmative defense encourages an em-
ployee to confront the putative harasser or inform a supervisor without negative consequences, it 
may provide a warning that certain behavior is inappropriate, thereby allowing the employer to 
deal with the behavior before liability develops. To the extent that Title VII seeks compliance 
rather than litigation, this may be the notice-serving function's only redeeming feature. 
231. See Balkin, supra note 21, at 2298 (suggesting that employers will create broad prohibi-
tions on speech to avoid Title VII liability in part because employers must eliminate all conduct 
that can help create a hostile environment, not merely individual comments). 
232. See id. at 2305 & n.32 (noting that it is sensible to hold employers responsible for hos-
tile environments even if the result is collateral censorship of employees). 
233. Various arguments have been made suggesting that hostile work environment harassment 
is inconsistent with the First Amendment. ld. at 2296. Balkin notes that two arguments have been 
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of the scope of this Article.234 
Were retaining the unwelcomeness requirement costless, doing so 
might appear sensible. However, there is harm in keeping it. The 
emerging doctrine of sexual harassment recalls Title VII'~ core goals of 
eliminating gender discrimination and empowering all workers.235 As 
courts continue to recognize that sexual harassment law protects work-
ers from all types of gender-based harassment that can limit their op-
portunities,236 the unwelcomeness requirement improperly limits the 
type of conduct that may yield sexual harassment liability. As eliminat-
ing gender-related barriers to workplace success is a proper aim of Ti-
tle VII,237 sexual harassment law must be structured toward that end, or 
at least should not be structured in opposition to those ends. 
In addition, the unwelcomeness requirement's central message-that 
potentially harassing workplace conduct should be considered welcome 
until someone complains about it-may delay the realization of Title 
VII's goals. That message allows and, in some respects, encourages the 
sexualization of a workplace up to the level where an employee will 
complain about the conduct and allows the sexualization of a workplace 
up to the level at which an individual employee no longer will or can 
tolerate it.238 This puts the onus on those who feel uncomfortable to 
complain rather than on those engaging in potentially harassing conduct 
made that liability for hostile work environment harassment is incompatible with the First 
Amendment: 
/d. 
The first concedes that the creation of a hostile [work] environment is not protected 
speech, but argues that fear of Title VII liability will lead employers to censor em-
ployee speech and that this chilling effect violates the First Amendment. . . . The 
second, and more radical attack on hostile environment liability argues that when 
employers create a hostile environment that materially alters working conditions to 
the disadvantage of women and minorities, they are engaged in protected speech. 
234. For now, other scholars can explain why Title VII's prohibition on providing terms or 
conditions of employment on a discriminatory basis does not violate the First Amendment. See, 
e.g., Balkin, supra note 21, at 2318-20; Deborah Epstein, Free Speech at Work: Verbal Harass-
ment as Gender-Based Discriminatory (Mis)Treatment, 85 GEO. L.J. 649 (1997). 
235. As Professor Vicki Schultz has noted, unwelcomeness' narrow focus on sex has limited 
sexual harassment law's use in broadly "promot[ing] women's empowerment and equality as 
workers." Schultz, supra note 15, at 1729 (noting that the unwelcomeness inquiry is related to 
courts' willingness to "focus[] on sexual advances as the quintessential harassment"). 
236. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1997) (ruling that same-
sex sexual harassment should be analyzed like any other type of sexual harassment). 
237. See Schultz supra note 15, at 1796. Schultz notes that: 
/d. 
The new account of hostile work environment harassment would restore harassment 
law to Title VII's original purpose. From the beginning, the central purpose of the 
statute's prohibition against sex discrimination has been to enable everyone-
regardless of their identities as men or women, or their personae as masculine or 
feminine-to pursue their chosen endeavors on equal, empowering terms. 
238. However, this does not mean that the employee will actually complain; the employee 
may simply quit. Radford, supra note 48, at 523 (presenting studies suggesting that victims of 
harassment are as likely to change jobs as to complain). 
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to refrain. 239 While workplaces infused with sexual banter, potentially 
harassing behavior, and the expectation of conformity to gender roles 
can be nondiscriminatory, little reason exists to believe that they gener-
ally are. If employees are free to engage in potentially harassing behav-
ior until being told to stop, such behavior could be legion well before 
any such conduct would be actionable, thereby making employees' jobs 
more difficult to do because of their gender, based <;m conduct not con-
sidered by the courts to be unwelcome. 
As noted above, a strictly enforced unwelcomeness requirement 
would require that all conduct used to support a hostile work environ-
ment claim be unwelcome, putting the plaintiff in the difficult position 
of accepting potentially harassing conduct without future recourse or 
complaining enough to garner a troublesome reputation and poor treat-
ment in the workplace. 240 Unfortunately, such a reputation may create 
problems for the employee that can make her working environment dif-
ficult or shape future employment decisions respecting her. 241 This is a 
choice that an employee should not have to face in the wake of Title 
VII.242 
The unwelcomeness requirement also affirmatively protects the pu-
tative harasser who did not realize that the target of his conduct did not 
welcome it. Such protection inappropriately validates a putative ha-
rasser's mistake even when the harasser's conduct occurs in the work-
place-a place Title VII suggests should be free of sex discrimination-
and even though actionable sexual harassment does not render the ha-
rasser personally liable. 243 However, more important than protecting the 
putative harasser from nonexistent Title VII liability, the unwelcome-
ness requirement may help protect the harasser's reputation in the 
239. See Weiner, supra note 69, at 649 ("Sexual harassment policies that instruct victims that 
they must stand up to their harassers also have the effect of teaching harassers that they may do 
or say anything sexual to anyone until they are told to stop."). 
240. See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 922 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting plaintiffs 
complaints of ostracism after reporting harassment); Howard v. Burns Bros., Inc., 149 F.3d 835, 
839 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that one of the issues raised by the plaintiff was that she was ostra-
cized after she helped another employee with a harassment complaint). 
241. This is not a reference to retaliation, just a reference to those situations in which the 
ability to get along with difficult people is viewed as merit. 
242. However, at least one court has suggested that the discomfort stemming from reporting 
sexual harassment is to be borne by the plaintiff, at least in some contexts. See Alberter v. 
McDonald's Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1138, ll50 (D. Nev. 1999). The Alberter court stated that: 
Discussing inappropriate sexual behavior with managers or employers will cause 
some degree of discomfort in almost all cases. Many victims of sexual harassment 
fear reprisals or negative reaction. Yet the high court has stated that it is, at least 
in part, the duty of the victim of sexual harassment to take action. 
Alberter, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1150. 
243. See Van Jelgerhuis v. Mercury Fin. Co., 940 F. Supp. 1344, 1362 (S.D. Ind. 1996) 
(finding no individual liability under Title VII for harassing supervisor); Chambers, supra note 
6, at 1605 n.59 (listing cases ruling that there is no individual Title VII liability for harassers). 
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workplace. By allowing the harasser to argue that he literally did noth-
ing wrong because the plaintiff welcomed the conduct and was not 
harmed by it, the unwelcomeness requirement may allow the harasser 
to fairly claim that he did not breach workplace or societal norms. 244 
Thus, the requirement may allow harassment to pass as unremediable 
horseplay and may allow the harasser to suggest that his conduct was 
playful or misunderstood, and thereby brand the plaintiff a dishonest 
flirt who welcomed the conduct or an inflexible prude. The possibility 
of such reprisals may deter others from challenging harassment, either 
in the workplace or in court. 245 Of course, harassment that is not 
charged formally or addressed informally will not be remedied. 
Hostile work environment harassment jurisprudence is geared to-
ward giving every worker an environment free of harassing conduct 
that may lead to the discriminatory provision of terms or conditions of 
employment;246 it is not about eliminating sex or incivility from the 
workplace. 247 Flowing from Title VII, hostile work environment doc-
trine should be used to protect employees from the effects of gendered 
workplaces that yield discriminatory terms or conditions of employ-
ment. The unwelcomeness requirement allows some potentially harass-
ing conduct to go unchecked and without consequence unless someone 
244. However, that the unwelcomeness requirement may lead to a dismissal of a case does not 
necessarily suggest that the underlying conduct involved was appropriate or beneficial to the 
workplace atmosphere, it merely suggests that Title VII will not make the employer liable for the 
behavior. 
245. See Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Auth., 4 F. Supp. 2d 144, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 
1998), rev'd, 252 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting incident in which plaintiff was told that "her 
[harassment] complaints could be detrimental to her career."); Notice in Hostile Environment 
Discrimination Law, supra note 36, at 1987 ("Harassment complaints often lead to negative job 
evaluations, denials of promotions, transfers, and firing. Informal sanctions from co-workers and 
supervisors, such as withdrawal of job support and social support, are also common. Moreover, 
a harassment victim may be publicly labeled a liar, hysteric, or troublemaker.") (footnotes omit-
ted); Monnin, supra note 78, at 1159. Monnin states that: 
/d. 
Few women complain of being sexually harassed because the noneconomic costs of 
reporting an incident are seen as prohibitive. Women fear that they will be blamed 
for the conduct, that nothing would be done in the event of a complaint, and that 
they would suffer negative repercussions in the form of retaliation and further har-
assment. 
246. Of course, the elimination of objectively offensive conduct does not require the elimina-
tion of all workplace harassment. See Benedet, supra note 61, at 134. Benedet states that: 
/d. 
The presence of an objective standard [of offense] indicates that some verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature, even if unwanted by and unwelcome to the 
plaintiff, is not actionable sexual harassment. Some degree of harassment is thus 
permissible, regardless of its effects on the plaintiff, because it does not possess 
the characteristics that render it objectively unreasonable. 
247. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (noting that Title VII 
is not a civility code); Balkin, supra note 21, at 2308 (noting that Title VII's prohibition on 
sexual harassment is not about civility, it is about prohibiting conduct that attempts "to maintain 
the inferior status of women"). 
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complains about it contemporaneously. The unwelcomeness require-
ment conflicts with Title VII's goals and must yield because potentially 
harassing conduct, whether welcome or not or complained of or not, 
can help create a hostile work environment. As sexual harassment ju-
risprudence has outgrown any reasonable use of the unwelcomeness 
requirement, the requirement should be eliminated. Though merely re-
laxing the requirement may seem preferable, keeping the requirement in 
any form would allow courts to misuse it. 
However, one role may remain for welcomeness. Welcomeness 
may always remain an evidentiary issue related to damages in a sexual 
harassment case by informing how severely a plaintiff's conditions of 
employment were changed and how much damage a plaintiff suffered. 
It might be relevant to some issues in some cases, though it would not 
be dispositive of the existence of a claim. 248 This narrow evidentiary 
use is the only appropriate use of welcomeness in sexual harassment 
law. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Title VII's goal is to stop gender discrimination in the workplace. 
The unwelcomeness requirement no longer serves that goal, if it ever 
did. 249 Indeed, the unwelcomeness requirement no longer serves either 
of its theoretically appropriate purposes: to guarantee that sexual har-
assment harm has occurred and to provide notice to the putative ha-
rasser or the employer that the conduct is unwelcome. As conduct that 
can support a sexual harassment claim has been broadened to include all 
gender-based harassment that affects an employee's terms or conditions 
of employment, the lack of unwelcomeness does not guarantee the lack 
of harm, and when notice is required, other provisions of sexual har-
assment law guarantee that notice exists. 
The unwelcomeness requirement encourages the sexualization of 
workplaces in ways that can harm the ultimate goal of workplace gen-
der equality by suggesting that offensive gender-motivated workplace 
conduct should be deemed normal and go unchecked until someone is 
willing to say it is unwelcome. This allows for a gendered workplace 
248. Indeed, such an approach may accommodate those who suggest that the unwelcomeness 
requirement should be retained in sotne form, lest its elimination indicate that women lack the 
ability to consent to sexual conduct in or related to the workplace. See Abrams, supra note 15, at 
1222-24 (arguing that a number of commentators wish to retain the unwelcomeness requirement 
and providing an alternative to the current unwelcomeness model). 
249. Commentators have noted that theories underlying the unwelcomeness requirement would 
not be at all convincing outside of the sexual harassment context. See, e.g., Benedet, supra note 
61, at 165 (suggesting that unwelcomeness is used inappropriately in the sexual harassment con-
text in a way it would never be used in the racial harassment context); see also Hebert, supra 
note 149, at 588. 
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that appears acceptable even as employees' terms or conditions of em-
ployment are actually being harmed by the workplace atmosphere. 
The unwelcomeness requirement should be eliminated because it no 
longer serves any useful purpose that is not already served by another 
feature of sexual harassment law and is at odds with Title VII's goals. 

